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1. The consequences of church competition 
When people outside sociological classrooms hear about church competition, 
they think primarily about conflicts or disagreements between religious groups. From a 
deep history of the West-East Schism and the Reformation to the more recent Yugoslav 
wars, there have been plenty of religious conflicts that have led to political 
disagreements, economic competition, and casualties. However, comparative 
sociologists often view church competition as something else. Church competition is 
often studied as a part of a broader agenda labeled in sociological literature with many 
names, e.g. religious economies, supply-side theories or church competition theory. 
Leaving details aside, these names are used to call a stream of thoughts defending the 
idea that a diverse supply of religious products and services explains religious vitality in 
certain societies if not around the Globe. According to this theory, competition provides 
additional incentives for churches to fight for their congregation. Consequently, 
religious identities and practices of people are inspired and reinforced by churches.  
 Although this theory was praised as the “new paradigm” (Warner 1993), “most 
popular alternative to traditional secularization theory” (Norris and Inglehart 2011), and 
“one of the most prominent approaches that explain religious change” (Pickel and 
Sammet 2012), it has been widely challenged in recent decades. More recent 
comparative studies have shown that church competition does not have uniform effects 
on religious participation and depends on many other factors (Chaves and Gorski 2001; 
Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002).  
Nevertheless, despite the ample criticism, this theory has not been rejected 
completely (Lechner, 2007). Both adherents and critics agree that this theory has been 
put on hold waiting for more theoretical clarification and empirical scrutiny; that the 
influence of religious markets could be studied better when the social context is studied 
	 7	
(i.e. the “ecological perspective”); and that institutions that shape religious markets 
were formed back in history. Therefore a test of the theory has to include a historical 
dimension (i.e. the “path-dependency perspective”). 
However, few studies have advanced these points empirically. This dissertation 
aims to fill this gap in the existing knowledge and study church competition in its 
context. For that purpose, this dissertation will invite a reader to such different places as 
the Netherlands in the 19th century as well as Ukraine in the 21st century.  These places, 
being distant in time and space, will serve to tell a story about church competition 
embedded in its context of economic modernization and national revivals.  
Besides academic debates, the consequences of religious competition have 
profound social relevance. When I was little, adults around me had experienced one of 
the most traumatic existential challenges possible. They had lost their country and 
identity, although they had not lost their houses, commodities, and communities. 
Everything was still there and yet everything was different. The Soviet Union collapsed 
along with its ideology and promises. Naturally, new ideas and ideologies started to fill 
this gap. Although most of these ideas were about nationalism, democracy and 
capitalism, this was also a time when many people around me started ‘trying out’ 
religion. Many Ukrainian atheists, including my parents (highly skilled natural 
scientists), approached religion directly, reading the Bible as a manual if not a to-do list. 
Once my parents read that holy water can cure people, they ‘tried it’ out on me as one 
would try medical syrup. Neither faith nor spiritual beliefs guided such actions. My 
parents were far from being in minority. In fact, the number of people who identified 
with the Orthodox Church tripled in a short period of time (Yelensky 2010).  
So how come so many people with no prior religious socialization, faith or 
spiritual curiosity were so keen to identify with a particular religious denomination? 
	 8	
One can imagine a number of alternative scenarios that could have happened. Research 
showed that the religious beliefs and practices of many Ukrainians were eclectic 
(Borowik 2002). There is a good chance that religious ideas of many people could have 
been dislodged by beliefs in paganism or witchcraft. So why the Orthodox Church? A 
lot of evidence exists to suggest that the role of political and clerical elites was pivotal 
(Yelensky 2010, Karpov 2013). Not only did they generate a significant supply of 
religious products and services, this religious supply was very competitive. In other 
words, religious groups tried to increase their congregations at the cost of other 
religious organizations (Krindatch 2003). As this dissertation shows, had the religious 
supply of Orthodox groups been less competitive, fewer Ukrainians would have joined 
the Orthodox Church. 
What are the consequences of church competition? This dissertation provides 
evidence for church competition that goes beyond dogmatic lines and involves cultural 
or nationalistic sentiments, which could explain occupational status attainment, people’s 
religious participation in the long run, and religious revivals in post-Communist 
environment.  
 
1.2. Goals of this dissertation 
There is a well-accepted consensus in the existing literature that the theory of 
church competition has been put on hold waiting for more theoretical clarification and 
empirical scrutiny (Lechner 2007). Church competition should be studied in line with 
the ecological and path-dependency perspectives. The main goal of this dissertation is to 
answer to this demand. Each chapter of this dissertation has its own goals. 
The goal of the first chapter is to study the interaction of religious competition 
and economic modernization in the Netherlands during the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
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Religious competition between Roman Catholics, Liberal Protestants and so-called 
Orthodox Protestants was embedded in the process of economic modernization. While 
previous studies largely focused on a division between Catholics and Protestants, this 
chapter stresses the intra-doctrinal schisms within Protestant groups. Such divisions are 
known in the literature as pillarization. The first chapter aims to study the extent to 
which pillarization influenced occupational attainment of male workers. 
The goal of the second chapter is to explore historical legacies of pillarization in 
the Netherlands with respect to religious belonging. While previous studies have 
stressed the theoretical importance of path-dependency, very few of them have 
investigated this matter empirically. Most of the historical studies focus on the past, 
rarely modeling the long-term consequences of historical religious markets. This 
chapter analyzes whether religious competition in 1909 in the Netherlands influences 
religious belonging in the same country in the 2000s. 
 The goal of the third chapter is to address intra-doctrinal competition of the 
Orthodox Church jurisdictions in the context of post-Communist religious and national 
revivals. This chapter shows that intra-doctrinal competition of the Orthodox 
jurisdictions positively affected religious affiliations, church attendance, subjective 
religiosity, and praying at home among Ukrainians. This effect was particularly strong 
for individuals who preferred Ukrainian language.  
 
1.3. The contributions of this dissertation 
The first chapter of this dissertation shows that religious competition in the 19th 
and early 20th centuries influences occupational attainment of Dutch male workers. 
Although the existing literature provides some scarce evidence that Protestant men were 
more successful than Roman Catholic men, this literature does not distinguish between 
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more liberal types of Protestants and more conservative types of Orthodox Protestants 
with respect to their occupational status attainment. The present chapter provides the 
first large-scale attempt to investigate this matter. Besides showing the impact of church 
competition on occupational mobility, this chapter improves on two classic research 
traditions in economics and sociology: firstly, relating religion to individual economic 
performance; and secondly, relating economic modernization to occupational status 
attainment. 
The second chapter of this dissertation contributes to the debate about historical 
legacies of religious competition. Although previous studies have examined religious 
markets in the past as well as in the present, there are very few studies that combine 
these two perspectives. This chapter explores historical data on religious affiliations 
merged with more recent attitudinal surveys in the Netherlands. The analysis suggests 
that religious socialization as well as pillarization have a long-term effect on the present 
religious belonging. Finally, this chapter employs a method proposed by Voas, Crockett 
and Olson (2002) to validate statistical analysis. Although this method has been 
extensively cited in the existing literature, very few studies have actually replicated it.  
 The third chapter is the first empirical investigation of Ukraine with respect to 
church competition and religious vitality. Although recent literature has questioned the 
role that religious markets played in religious revivals in post-Communist Europe, this 
chapter shows that this literature has overlooked a key factor of religious revivals, 
namely, the link between national and religious identity. This chapter suggests that 
nationalistic competition between the Orthodox jurisdictions in Ukraine has positively 
affected religious affiliations, church attendance, subjective religiosity and the 
frequency of prayer among Ukrainians.  
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1.4. Brief summary of each chapter 
1.4.1. Summary of chapter 1.  
 The first chapter, titled “Religious Communities and Social Mobility. Status 
Attainment among Orthodox Protestants, Liberal Protestants, and Roman Catholics in 
the Netherlands, 1859-1918”, engages with the classical debate on the role of 
Protestantism as an engine of economic growth. This is done by exploiting a unique 
database comprising of the occupations of more than 300,000 Dutch men nested in 
more than 400 Dutch municipalities of different religious denominations during the 
1859-1918 period.  
The existing literature has cast some doubts that Protestantism, as devotion, was 
the key explanation of economic differences between mostly Protestant and Catholic 
territories. This chapter shows the crucial role that intra-doctrinal differences among 
Protestant communities – in interaction with modernization forces – played in shaping 
men’s occupational mobility in the Netherlands. 
This chapter explores an excellent individual level historical dataset of all 
marital records from all municipalities in five Dutch provinces (Gelderland, Groningen, 
Limburg, Overijssel, and Zeeland). In order to measure the occupational attainment of 
men, their occupation is first coded using the HISCO scheme, a standard classification 
for occupations in the 18th and 19th centuries. These individual data are enriched with 
contextual data about economic modernization at the municipal level. Economic 
modernization is measured as division of labor, educational expansion, urbanization, 
mass transport, mass communication, and geographical mobility.  
A set of hierarchical regression models suggests that the economic success of 
Liberal Protestants was more strongly affected by modernization than the economic 
success of the adherents of the other denominations. This is also reflected in a greater 
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likelihood for sons of Liberal Protestants to have an occupation of a different status than 
that of their father. All in all, the data confirm that there was a significant difference in 
the process of status attainment of Dutch men between Liberal and Orthodox Protestant 
communities which was explained by their relationship to modernization. Catholics 
often took the middle position. This finding is in contrast with the prior view that such 
difference should be exclusive to Protestants and Catholics. Therefore, the specific 
religious stratification of the Dutch society (i.e. pillarization) influenced the economic 
performance of individuals. 
	
1.4.2. Summary of chapter 2.  
The second chapter, titled “The long-term effects of religious markets, religious 
tradition, and institutions: secularization in the Netherlands in 1909 and 2000s”, 
explores historical legacies of religious competition by combining historical data with 
contemporary attitudinal surveys. This chapter offers a theoretical synthesis of religious 
market, ecological, and path-dependency perspectives to answer whether Protestant and 
Catholic religious markets in 1909 left an enduring influence on religious affiliations in 
the Netherlands today.  
The existing literature offers some historical assessments of religious markets 
and religious vitality, yet with certain limitations. Most of the studies address religious 
markets in religiosity of people either in the past or in the present. However, there are 
very few studies that include both of these dimensions, i.e. explain the present by the 
past. In order to overcome this limitation, historical data for the Netherlands in 1909 are 
merged with survey data for the same country from 2002 to 2008. 
Voas, Olson and Crockett (2002) demonstrated that there is a mathematical 
association between measures of religious competition and religious vitality that 
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produces non-zero correlation. They proposed a method to estimate such spuriousness. 
Following their method, bootstrapping simulations were employed showing that the 
statistical analysis of this chapter was not contaminated.  
This chapter suggests that higher religious concentration in 1909 yielded higher 
religiosity for Catholic regions in the 2000s. In contrast, religious concentration across 
mostly Protestant territories in 1909 is associated with secularization in the 2000s. The 
main argument provided in this chapter is that historical identities and social 
organization of Protestant and Catholic groups have had an enduring effect on the 
present-day religious participation of people. Protestant tradition is built on weaker 
church authority as well as earlier individual-based consumption of religious products. 
The fact that both Protestant and Catholic communities reinforced their worldviews and 
practices in isolation from each other (i.e. pillarization) exacerbated their differences in 
religious participation. While intra-doctrinal competition of Protestants contributed to 
the existence of competitive religious markets in some of the regions. 
	
1.4.3. Summary of chapter 3. 
The third chapter, titled “Church competition hypothesis revisited: new evidence 
from Ukraine, 1992-2012”, applies the framework of religious competition to study 
religious revivals in Ukraine. Recent literature has questioned the role that religious 
markets played in religious revivals in post-Communist Europe. However, most of the 
studies have overlooked the link between national identity and religious identity.  
Drawing on the literature on post-Communist transformations as well as 
Ukrainian religious revivals, this paper suggests that religious groups became important 
actors of the political process in Ukraine; that they exploited narratives about an 
idealized past as well as an utopian future of the nation to mobilize their congregation; 
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that furthermore this nationalistic competition contributed to the split within the 
Orthodox Church in Ukraine. These processes are theorized to affect religious values 
and behavior of people in Ukraine.  
 A novel dataset of religious communities was collected for the purpose of 
empirical analysis. Although similar data have been employed in the existing literature 
(Balakirieva and Sereda 2013; Yelensky 2010; Krindatch 2003), the present data 
include the hitherto longest series and includes cross-regional comparisons.   
A set of hierarchical and OLS models confirmed that intra-doctrinal competition 
of the Orthodox jurisdictions itself has positively affected religious affiliations, church 
attendance, subjective religiosity and the frequency of prayer among Ukrainians. 
Considering religious affiliations, this effect was particularly among people who 
preferred Ukrainian language.  
	
1.5. Conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
 The main goal of this dissertation was to study church competition in line with 
ecological and path-dependency perspectives. In order to achieve this goal, a series of 
studies was conducted employing historical and attitudinal data about intra-doctrinal 
competition and religious participation in the Netherlands and Ukraine. This dissertation 
shows that when historical context as well as the institutions that frame church 
competition is modeled directly, church competition theory explains occupational 
mobility, religious belonging as well as religious behavior in a wide range of settings. 
Furthermore, it shows that intra-doctrinal competition is important when religious 
participation is studied. 
As to the goals of the first chapter, church competition modeled as pillarization 
indeed influences occupational mobility of Dutch men during economic modernization 
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in the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries. Considering the goals of the second 
chapter, religious belonging in the Netherlands increases when individual-based 
religious consumption has been cultivated for generations, and both Protestant and 
Catholic communities reinforced their worldviews and practices in isolation from each 
other (i.e. pillarization). Finally, considering the third goal of this dissertation, intra-
doctrinal Orthodox nationalistic competition positively affected religious belonging and 
behavior of Ukrainians.  
 Overall, this dissertation confirms some old ideas that religious markets are 
indeed strong predictors of religious participation once a relevant context is properly 
considered. However, this dissertation offers some new ideas as well. It shows that 
intra-doctrinal competition is an important dimension of religious markets. 
Disagreements between Liberal and Orthodox Protestants in the Netherlands as well as 
between the Kyivan and Moscow jurisdictions of the Orthodox Church in Ukraine 
played a crucial role for economic, political and religious outcomes in these societies. 
Despite ample criticism in the existing literature, church competition theory is far from 
being irrelevant yet. Given the evidence provided in this dissertation, church 
competition theory remains a valuable part of sociological knowledge.   
 The findings of this dissertation provide some questions for future research as 
well. Future studies could apply the proposed framework of intra-doctrinal competition 
to other Orthodox societies, which witnessed strong intra-doctrinal divisions, such as 
Bulgaria, Moldova, and Macedonia. However, this framework does not have to be 
limited to Orthodox Churches only. One may think about competition of different 
streams of Protestantism in Western societies, Sunni and Shia in Middle East, and 
Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics in Eastern Europe. Another line of future 
research could be connected with cross-national comparisons. Although church 
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competition theory is helpful for understanding religious belonging and behavior in 
some countries, it is still difficult to employ it in a large-scale comparative perspective. 
Future studies could endeavor to study multiple contexts in one coherent theoretical and 
empirical framework.  
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2. Chapter 1. Religious Communities and Social Mobility. Status Attainment among 
Orthodox Protestants, Liberal Protestants, and Roman Catholics in the Netherlands, 
1859-19181 
	
Abstract: Recent studies have cast doubts on the idea that Protestantism was the key to 
explaining economic differences between Protestant and Catholic geographies. Differences in 
human capital and technological innovations have been suggested as alternative explanations. 
We contribute to this debate by investigating the role of cultural conservatism in hampering the 
embracement of technological innovation and, as a consequence, economic success. We study 
the status attainment of more than 300,000 Dutch men in the period 1859-1918 in 446 Dutch 
municipalities. The municipalities differed greatly with respect to religious composition and 
modernization. Whereas Catholics were in general conservative, Dutch Protestants were divided 
across communities of a more liberal and a more conservative character. Our analyses show that 
the interplay of conservatism and economic modernization shaped the occupational status 
attainment of men.  
 
2.1. Introduction 
A century ago the German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) noted that the 
economically most advanced countries of his day were, in whole or in part, Protestant, 
and that within religiously mixed countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, the 
most successful businessmen were Protestants (and not Catholics) in general, and 
																																								 																				
1 This paper was written with Ineke Maas and Marco van Leeuwen from Utrecht University. 
The collection of the data on the municipalities was supported by the European Research 
Council (Advanced Grant no. 230279, 2009–14), “Toward Open Societies? Trends, Variations 
and Driving Forces of Intergenerational Social Mobility in Europe over the Past Three 
Centuries.”  
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Calvinists in particular. Looking for an explanation, he turned to what he saw as the 
nexus between the mindset of the average Calvinist and the mindset needed to pursue 
modern, capitalist economic activities. In his view, the Calvinist mindset led to a greater 
predisposition to economic modernization. We will discuss Weber’s ideas later in more 
detail, but at this stage it will suffice to state that his thesis on the religious roots of the 
spirit of capitalism lends itself to being empirically tested in the Netherlands, arguably 
the most Calvinist country in the world. 
We are certainly not the first to explore this relationship. Recently several 
economic-historical studies have endeavored to confirm whether Weber was correct 
about economic advances being more prominent among Protestants than Catholics 
(Delacroix and Nielsen 2001; Becker and Woessmann 2009, 2010; Cantoni 2015). 
These studies focused mostly on macro indicators, such as average tax revenues, 
railroad networks, and city size, as dependent variables and provided mixed findings 
about the impact of religion. Sociological studies on Weber’s hypothesis have more 
often compared individual economic success or economic attitudes among Protestants 
and Catholics, leading to a similar mixture of positive and negative findings (Lenski 
1961; Bouma 1973; Cohen 1985; Lehrer 2004; Hayward and Kemmelmeier 2011). Yet, 
to the best of our knowledge, very few studies have combined these two approaches by 
investigating the role that religious stratification played in shaping the individual 
economic performance of individuals in a long-term perspective. The lack of historical 
individual data hampered such investigations for a long time (van Leeuwen and Maas 
2010). In order to fill this gap, we employ excellent Dutch data on the economic success 
of individuals in terms of occupations and intergenerational mobility (Genlias 2009). 
Our data contain information from all civil marriage certificates in five (out of eleven) 
provinces in the Netherlands during the period of economic modernization from 1859 to 
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1918. Marriage certificates for 336,304 men living in 446 municipalities are included in 
our database. These certificates include information on the occupation of the 
bridegroom and the occupation of his father. Furthermore, the data are enriched with 
contextual information on economic modernization in Dutch municipalities, measured 
in terms of the division of labor, educational expansion, urbanization, mass 
transportation, and mass communication. All the municipalities are classified in terms 
of the predominant religious group. 
Our research questions are (1) whether Liberal Protestants and/or Orthodox 
Protestants had a higher occupational status than Roman Catholics during economic 
modernization, (2) whether the influence of a father’s status on his son’s status differed 
between the three denominations, and (3) whether modernization affected the status 
attainment of members of the three denominations differently. 
The contribution of our study is two-fold. On the one hand, our research 
questions extend the literature that links the Protestant Reformation to subsequent 
economic developments in Europe (Becker, Pfaff, and Rubin 2016). We add to this 
literature by analyzing individuals’ occupational status attainment in the Netherlands 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. At that time, the Dutch population 
was organized along religious lines between Roman Catholics, Liberal Protestants, and 
Orthodox Protestants (also known as Re-Reformed Protestants). We will contrast the 
traditional Weberian explanation, according to which all Protestants performed better 
than Catholics, with an alternative explanation based on the denomination’s 
conservatism. According to the latter, Orthodox Protestants resembled Catholics. 
Although a few studies show that Protestants generally occupied higher social positions 
than Catholics (van Poppel, Liefbroer, and Schellekens 2003; Zijdeman 2010), these 
findings are based on small regions within the Netherlands and do not distinguish 
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between Orthodox and Liberal Protestants. To the best of our knowledge, the present 
paper is the first large-scale attempt to investigate this matter. 
On the other hand, our research questions extend another scholarly tradition 
relating economic modernization to intergenerational social mobility (Inkeles 1960; 
Kerr et al. 1960; Blau and Duncan 1967; Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991; Lipset 
and Bendix 1961; Erikson and Goldthorpe 1992; van Leeuwen and Maas 2010; Yaish 
and Andersen 2012). The earlier debates about the causal link between modernization 
and intergenerational social mobility were intense. The Research Committee on Social 
Stratification and Mobility of the International Sociological Association concluded that 
“Modernization theory is wrong” (Hout and DiPrete 2006, p. 8). However, this 
conclusion was based on studies that mainly covered the second half of the twentieth 
century. In most Western countries, many modernization processes took place before 
the twentieth century. In fact, when new historical data on social mobility in Europe are 
analyzed, more evidence is found that modernization did increase social mobility (Maas 
and van Leeuwen 2016; van Leeuwen et al. 2016). However, it is still difficult to 
explain changes in social mobility over time and differences in the level of social 
mobility between regions. Knigge, Maas, and van Leeuwen (2014) showed that pivotal 
indicators of modernization – industrialization and educational expansion – could not 
explain the trends. Part of the regional and temporal differences in mobility could be 
explained by developments in the means of mass transportation and mass 
communication, but a large part remained unexplained. We improve on this literature by 
investigating to what extent the religious environment directly affected status 
attainment, and to what extent it affected how people reacted to modernization 
processes.  
	 21	
This article is organized as follows. We start with a description of religious 
cleavages in the Netherlands. Then we discuss theoretical mechanisms that could 
influence the occupational status attainment of Liberal Protestants, Orthodox 
Protestants, and Roman Catholics in the Netherlands during modernization. Our data, 
measures, and design are presented in the following part. We conclude our paper with 
the results of our analysis and a discussion of the findings, limitations, and implications. 
2.2. Religious cleavages in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century is 
often said to have been a “pillarized” society. Pillarization is the term coined by 
Lijphart (1975) to denote deep, institutionalized cleavages between Dutch religious and 
political groups. Although there have been various suggestions as to how to classify the 
major “pillars”, we follow the tradition established in the Dutch historical literature and 
distinguish three religious pillars: “Roman Catholics”, “Orthodox Protestants”, and 
“Liberal Protestants” (Lijphart 1975; Post 1989; Hendrickx, Lammers, and Ultee 1991; 
de Rooy 2002; van Bavel and Kok 2010). In our study, we will focus on the religious 
cleavages only, and not study the “socialist pillar” that originated later than the other 
pillars and had a lesser influence in the period we are studying. Religion played a 
crucial role in the social life of Dutch people prior to the twentieth century (van Bavel 
and Kok 2005), and this warrants our decision to focus on religious groups due to their 
strong presence and significance in the public sphere. 
While it is impossible to establish when pillarization began in the Netherlands, it 
certainly had a grip on the country after 1880 (van Bavel and Kok 2010). Its signs can 
be traced back further – to the Reformation – but pillarization was given a boost by the 
restoration of the Catholic clerical hierarchy in 1853. From that year onwards the 
number of Catholic organizations increased significantly (Kok and van Bavel 2006), 
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and political mobilization among Catholics increased with the growing influence of 
Catholics in parliament (Cox 1993). The cleavages between Protestants and Roman 
Catholics increased over time. As Lijphart (1975) pointed out, in the nineteenth century 
there had been a number of joint trade unions in which Roman Catholics and Protestants 
worked together for their mutual benefit. However, in 1912 Catholic bishops forbade 
their flock from participating in these joint unions. 
In 1895, a new, Orthodox Protestant (also known as Re-Reformed Church) pillar 
emerged. The reasons for this division were rooted in the response of conservative 
Protestants to the country’s growing modernization. For instance, conservative religious 
groups did not favor an expansion of standardized public education provided by the 
state, which competed with religious schooling. Furthermore, some Protestants were 
engaged in political alliances with Catholics in order to build a stronger opposition to 
the expansion of state secular institutions. This repelled conservative Protestants, who 
were intolerant of cross-denominational alliances (Cox 1993). All said, the political 
division between the so-called Liberal and Orthodox Protestants increased the degree of 
pillarization. 
One of the pivotal features of pillarization is that religion influenced almost all 
the social institutions that regulated the lives of people. Individuals from the various 
religious communities made use of the schools, hospitals, sport organizations, and labor 
unions specific to their communities; they also read the newspapers and were members 
of the social clubs specific to their community (Boone et al. 2012). Furthermore, Liberal 
Protestants, Orthodox Protestants, and Roman Catholics created their own political 
parties (Cox 1993). Pillarization was probably reinforced by the geographical spread of 
religious groups in the Netherlands. Most Protestants lived in the north, whereas most 
Catholics lived in the south.  
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Figure 1.1. illustrates the municipalities included in our study and the pillar that 
predominated there in 1909 (the way we define “predominant” is discussed later in the 
text). As this figure shows, in 1909 the southwest of the Netherlands (the province of 
Zeeland) as well as the center of the country (the provinces of Gelderland and 
Overijssel) were settled by members of all the main pillars, with considerable 
commingling. The south (the province of Limburg) and the north (the province of 
Groningen), conversely, were more homogeneous: Roman Catholics inhabited the 
south, Protestants the north. 
Regarding Orthodox Protestants, the literature often describes them in terms of 
the so-called “Bible Belt” (Ruijs et al. 2011), with their communities stretching from the 
southwest to the northeast. However, our data do not cover all the provinces through 
which this “belt” stretches. The northern province of Groningen (e.g. Duivendijke, 
Meliskerke, Oostkapelle) and Zeeland in the southwest (Baflo, Bedum, Ulrum) were 
largely Orthodox Protestant. There were some Orthodox Protestant municipalities in the 
province of Overijssel too (such as Zwartsluis and Zalk en Veecaten). 
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Figure 1.1. Religious pillars in five Dutch Provinces (Zeeland, Gelderland, Overijssel, Limburg, 
and Groningen) in 1909. GIS data source: Huijsmans (2013) 
 
2.3. Differential effects of modernization on occupational status attainment by 
denomination 
Sociologists and historians frequently link the status of a person to his or her 
occupation (van Leeuwen and Maas 2010). Theoretically, a person’s occupation often 
defines his or her relative position in the social hierarchy. Methodologically, occupation 
is one of the few variables available in historical documents as well as comparably 
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across societies and time (Miles 1993; van Leeuwen, Maas, and Miles 2002). The study 
of occupational status attainment is concerned with the conditions under which children 
are able to attain a status different from that of their parents (Breen and Jonsson 2005; 
Ganzeboom, Treiman, and Ultee 1991). Traditionally, children inherited their place in 
the social hierarchy from their parents, and were trapped there. With modernization, 
more children attained a status different from that of their parents. 
There are different ways in which pillarization might have shaped the 
occupational status attainment of men. On the one hand, within a denomination a 
specific culture might have existed that was important for either the work ethic or the 
acceptance of modernization processes. On the other hand, individuals might have 
experienced economic modernization at different rates because of their geographical 
location and distance to industries. We call these possible alternative explanations of the 
role of pillarization the cultural mechanism and the economic modernization 
mechanism. The former can be addressed from the Weberian perspective as well as 
from the perspective of pillarization. We discuss these mechanisms in the following part 
of this paper. 
2.3.a. The Weberian cultural mechanism 
According to Weber – nicely summarized by Engerman (n.d.) – “it was 
Christian asceticism and Calvinism that provided the orientation that led to the 
development of such ideas as the ‘necessity of proving one’s faith in worldly activity,’ 
‘the preaching of hard, continuous bodily or mental labor,’ and ‘rational conduct on the 
basis of the idea of the calling’ that were to provide ‘the fundamental elements of the 
spirit of modern capitalism’”. (For more reviews of the Weber thesis see, for example, 
Jones 1997; Tawney 1998; Besnard 1970; Kalberg 1996, 2001; Barro and McClearly 
2003; Breiner 2005; McCleary and Barro 2006). 
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Within Calvinism, neither luxury nor pleasure were regarded as virtuous 
qualities; diligent work expressing the talents given by God was. This led to a 
predisposition to hard work and the ever more efficient, modern organization of work, 
made feasible through education and the efforts of each individual. 
Calvinist religion and economic modernity were connected in another way too. 
A Catholic could redeem his or her worldly flaws by doing good – by giving to charity 
for example – or having posterity do good in their name. This was thought to shorten 
the time spent in purgatory before one was admitted to a heaven where only a few 
humans were admitted immediately after death. Protestants in general and Calvinists in 
particular agreed with the latter point: only a few fortunate individuals would enter the 
kingdom of heaven directly. But they denied the existence of purgatory. As a 
consequence, according to a strict interpretation of Calvin’s dogmas, the chance of 
entering the kingdom of heaven was rather slim, and to make matters worse it depended 
not on human action but on divine election. Whether all Dutch Calvinists adhered to the 
dogma of predestination is an empirical question, and recent literature on charitable 
giving casts doubt on this (van Leeuwen 2012), but purgatory, with its redeeming 
effects, certainly was closed to Calvinists, who could do nothing to secure their 
salvation and were unaware of their fate until their death. Weber noted that a 
predestined life without redemption through good works or other individual action must 
create stress among the faithful. He surmised that to reduce stress, Calvinists tended to 
work diligently and rationally, at the very least to avoid economic failure, a near sure 
sign of not being elected, and maybe with a secret hope that economic success could be 
seen as foreshadowing election. 
Dutch Protestants – mainly Calvinists – might, according to this theory, be 
expected to have been economically more successful than Roman Catholics, who lacked 
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such calling. As Weber (1930) had already observed, Protestant sons of craft workers in 
Germany were more likely to employ modern methods of production, i.e. to work in 
factories, than their Catholic counterparts. This is in line with Protestants embracing 
modern capitalism and suggests that Protestants not only obtained a higher status, but 
also that they were more likely to be intergenerationally mobile, not just after the 
Reformation in the age of merchant capitalism, but also in the centuries to follow, 
including that of the nascent industrial capitalism we are studying. 
The spirit of modern capitalism required people not to stick to traditional ways 
of life, but to adapt if alternatives were more profitable. This leads one to expect that if 
a Protestant region were more modernized, those living there would grasp the new 
possibilities that modernization provided, even if that meant abandoning a more 
traditional way of life. In contrast, the Weberian cultural mechanism suggests that 
Roman Catholics were more likely to remain under the strong influence of their fathers, 
despite the process of economic modernization. On the basis of this cultural mechanism 
we expect: 
H1. Protestants to have attained a higher status than Roman Catholics. 
H2. The effect of father’s status on son’s status to have been weaker for 
Protestants than for Roman Catholics. 
H3. Modernization to have had a stronger positive effect on the status of 
Protestants than on the status of Roman Catholics. 
H4. Modernization to have had a stronger negative effect on the transfer of 
status from father to son for Protestants than for Roman Catholics. 
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2.3.b. The “cultural conservatism” mechanism  
A secondary cultural mechanism has also been suggested. Sociological, 
demographic, and historical investigations of the Netherlands have shown that members 
of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Protestant pillars were generally more 
traditionalistic than members of the Liberal Protestant pillar (Hendrickx, Lammers, and 
Ultee 1991; Schellekens and van Poppel 2006; van Bavel and Kok 2004, 2005, 2010; 
Poppel, Schellekens, and Liefbroer 2002). 
A vast literature suggests that Liberal Protestants, also outside the Netherlands, 
tended to have a less hierarchical culture, with a smaller role for kin and especially 
parents in making life decisions, including which job to take (Mitch 1992; Gorski 1993; 
Woodberry 2012). In contrast, as Kok and van Bavel (2006, p. 45) have pointed out, 
Dutch Orthodox Protestants were: 
 
[…] to become the strongest bulwark of Orthodoxy in the twentieth century. Their 
communities were characterized by a strong geographic and mental isolation; leaving 
the village was discouraged, newcomers were mistrusted and scientifically-based 
innovations such as inoculation and chemical fertilizers were often rejected. 
 
Dutch Roman Catholics were quite conservative and traditionalistic as well. The 
following example from van Bavel and Kok (2004) illustrate this. An important cause 
of infant mortality in rural areas was mothers using bottled milk mixed with poor-
quality water (Wintle 2000). In the nineteenth century the Dutch authorities launched a 
campaign to combat this. The idea of natural breastfeeding was promoted. Women who 
breastfed were promised a reward. The Catholic clergy, however, started their own 
campaign against breastfeeding, arguing that it was shameful for a mother to expose her 
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breast. As a result, Catholic women continued to use bottled milk and poor-quality 
water. 
On the basis of such cultural differences one would expect the dividing line with 
respect to the intergenerational transfer of status and how it is affected by modernization 
not to have been between Protestants and Roman Catholics, but between Liberal 
Protestants on the one hand and Orthodox Protestants and Roman Catholics on the 
other. Whereas Liberal Protestants were arguably open to new developments, Orthodox 
Protestants urged young men not to take up new modern occupations, just as Roman 
Catholics did. Thus, among Liberal Protestants we expect to find a father’s occupational 
status having a weaker influence on that of his son than among members of the other 
two denominations. 
We also expect to find modernization having decreased the importance of a 
father’s status most among Liberal Protestants. Industrialization created new job 
opportunities, but Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protestants might have had fewer 
opportunities to succeed in the new high-risk and highly innovative market due to their 
more hierarchical and traditional culture. Educational participation expanded, but the 
Roman Catholic and Orthodox Protestant schools and newspapers might have 
strengthened the religious culture instead of embracing modern values. Accordingly, the 
hypotheses derived from the cultural mechanism are as follows: 
H5. Liberal Protestants attained a higher status than Catholics and Orthodox 
Protestants 
H6. The effect of father’s status on son’s status was weaker for Liberal 
Protestants than for Catholics and Orthodox Protestants 
H7. Modernization had a stronger positive effect on the status of Liberal 
Protestants than on the status of Catholics and Orthodox Protestants 
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H8. Modernization had a stronger negative effect on the transfer of status from 
father to son for Liberal Protestants than for Catholics and Orthodox 
Protestants. 
 
2.3.c. The economic modernization mechanism 
Although according to Weber (1930) Protestants, and especially Calvinists, were 
motivated to strive for economic success because of their religion, more recent 
sociological and economic studies have emphasized alternative mechanisms that allied 
Protestants with economic success. These mechanisms are intertwined with but distinct 
from religion. The sociological literature has emphasized the ability of Protestants to 
create new anti-authoritarian and yet disciplined forms of social organization 
(associations, social clubs, for example), which were pivotal to creating innovative 
production and trade networks, disseminating innovations, and, inevitably, to promoting 
economic growth (Bouma 1973; Coleman 1990; Gorski 1993). Economists have 
emphasized the earlier investment by Protestants in publishing and literacy, 
technological innovations, institutionalizing education, as well as their promoting 
gender equality in education (Becker and Woessmann 2008, 2009; McCloskey 2010; 
Dittmar 2011; Hornung 2014; Mokyr 2016). 
All in all, this literature suggests that the economic success achieved by 
Protestants was due not to their religious devotion per se. The main explanation, 
according to the literature, is that Protestants managed to organize and maintain their 
social institutions in a way that would enhance the economic progress of their 
communities in the long run, regardless of the actual religious engagement of 
individuals. In contrast, owing to a number of historical circumstances, which went 
beyond dogmatic conduct, Catholics did not manage to arrange their social institutions 
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in the same way. Since this literature is focused on the long-run consequences of early 
economic decisions that affect the subsequent economic success of Protestants 
compared with Catholics, we label our explanations derived from this logic “the 
economic modernization mechanism”. 
According to the economic modernization mechanism, religion and culture 
might have had little to do with the economic success of and intergenerational mobility 
among Dutch men in the nineteenth century. Dutch Protestants might have lived in 
areas that witnessed greater economic development in the past. As a consequence, 
regardless of their devotion or conservatism, Protestants were more likely to have 
higher-status occupations different from the occupations of their fathers. Obviously, this 
argument suffers from endogeneity issues because the earlier development of the 
Netherlands might have been caused by earlier religious stratification, which in turn 
caused further economic development (Akçomak, Webbink, and ter Weel 2016). To 
properly test our hypotheses relating to cultural mechanisms, we need to take 
differences in modernization between regions populated by the different denominations 
into account. Note that, regardless of prior religious stratification, modernization was 
firmly entrenched in both Protestant and Catholic regions in the Netherlands (see the 
discussion of figures II to VII in the results section). Catholic regions had their harbors, 
warehouses, and factories, and Protestant regions had their villages and underdeveloped 
municipalities.  
If the economic modernization mechanism were at work, we would still expect 
Protestants to have had a higher status than Roman Catholics and the influence of a 
father’s occupational status on that of his son to have been weaker among Protestants 
than among Roman Catholics, but this difference should disappear once the level of 
modernization in the place where they live is taken into account.  
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 H9. Cross-pillar differences in occupational status attainment between Liberal 
Protestants, Catholics, and Orthodox Protestants disappear once the level of 
modernization in the place where they live is taken into account. 
 
2.4. Data and Methods 
2.4.a. Data 
This study follows in the footsteps of Zijdeman (2010), Knigge, Maas, and van 
Leeuwen (2002, 2014), Knigge et al. (2014), and Maas and van Leeuwen (2016) in 
using the Genlias dataset of all marital records from all municipalities in five Dutch 
provinces (Gelderland, Groningen, Limburg, Overijssel, and Zeeland) (Genlias 2009). 
However, our current dataset is restricted to 1859-1918 since not all of our contextual 
variables are available for other years. Marital records include not only the year and 
place of marriage but also information on the occupation of the bride, bridegroom, and 
their parents. We built a dataset by (1) selecting individual data; (2) gathering 
contextual variables at the municipal level; and (3) nesting our observations in groups to 
perform multilevel analysis. 
We select only men who married between the ages of 16 and 65 and whose 
occupation, place of birth, and father’s occupation are known. While there are few 
missing values for bridegroom’s occupation, his place of birth, or age at marriage, 
almost half of the records in the Genlias dataset lacked information on father’s 
occupation. Previous studies that employed the same data have discussed possible 
explanations for and the consequences of this issue (see Zijdeman 2010; Knigge, Maas, 
and van Leeuwen 2014; Maas and van Leeuwen 2016). Most likely the father was 
deceased at the time his son married, but it is also possible that he was not present at the 
marriage. One can assume that these missing data cause a bias, because individuals of 
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low occupational status were more likely to die earlier due to the nature of their hard 
labor or low quality of life. However, research has shown that there was no connection 
between social position and adult mortality in the Netherlands in the nineteenth century 
(Frinking and van Poppel 1979). Moreover, our comparison of men with and without 
parental information in the data shows that the distribution of their status was almost 
identical. This comparison suggests that our results are not biased by the selection of 
cases with complete information, although we cannot exclude the possibility that 
mobility patterns were different between the two groups. 
To investigate the role of modernization processes, the individual data were 
enriched with macro characteristics from a variety of historical sources. The majority of 
the contextual data were collected within the Towards Open Societies project, which 
investigates the social stratification structure and social mobility in Western societies in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Our variables were retrieved from the 
HISCI_NL10 dataset (for more details see Knigge, Maas, and van Leeuwen 2014). Our 
final merged dataset covers the period 1859 to 1918 since not all our contextual 
variables are available for other years. This period coincides with the decades in which 
both pillarization and economic modernization developed in the Netherlands. Like a 
number of scholars before us, we measure modernization as a complex process that 
includes changes in labor, educational expansion, means of mass transportation, mass 
communication, urbanization, and geographical mobility (Treiman 1975; Zijdeman 
2010). The empirical indicators are discussed further in the section on measures. 
All observed men were grouped in municipalities in a certain year in our dataset. 
Hence all individuals who registered their marriage in a given year in a given 
municipality are regarded as sharing the same context for occupational status 
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attainment. The final merge of all individual and contextual data yielded 336,304 
observations for the analysis, nested in 25,356 contexts.  
2.4.b. Measures 
Son’s occupational status (dependent variable). In order to measure the 
occupational status of the son (i.e. the bridegroom on the marital record), his occupation 
was first coded using the HISCO scheme (van Leeuwen, Maas, and Miles 2002), a 
standard classification for occupations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the 
historical version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO). 
The HISCO codes were transferred to HISCAM v.0.1 (Lambert et al. 2013), which is a 
historical version of the contemporary CAMSIS (Cambridge Social Interaction and 
Stratification) scale. CAMSIS scales are measures of social interaction distance (Bottero 
and Prandy 2003). The core assumption of this scale is that social interactions are more 
intense between socially close individuals. CAMSIS and its historical version HISCAM 
generate an interval scale to measure social status. The use of HISCAM and CAMSIS 
for historical research has been validated and discussed in the literature (see Zijdeman 
2010; Lambert et al. 2013; Knigge, Maas, and van Leeuwen 2014, Knigge et al. 2014; 
Schulz, Maas, and van Leeuwen 2015). 
Father’s occupational status. The occupational status of a bridegroom’s father is 
also measured by means of HISCAM v.0.1. 
Religious composition. In the dataset individual-level information on religious 
affiliation is absent. We use contextual data from the censuses to determine whether a 
particular municipality is inhabited mostly by members of a specific pillar. This enables 
us to study to what extent the religious environment influenced status attainment among 
Dutch men during modernization. 
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Data on the proportion of Liberal Protestants, Orthodox Protestant, and Roman 
Catholics in a municipality are retrieved from the Historical Ecological Database 
(HED). These data are taken from the Dutch censuses and are available for 
approximately every tenth year. For the years in between, we used linear interpolations. 
Due to the data discrepancies between different historical sources, the sum of the total 
population and the sum of all religious and non-religious groups were sometimes not 
identical. Nevertheless, the correlation between these two variables was very strong 
(0.99). 
Following Lijphart (1975) we defined the Orthodox Protestants as those labeled 
“Re-Reformed” (or Gereformeerd). Hence, we collapsed information on the members of 
all churches with the descriptor “Gereformeerd”: Gereformeerde gemeenten, 
Christelijke Gereformeerde Kerken, Gereformeerde Kerken, Overige Gereformeerden, 
and Oud Gereformeerden. As van Bavel and Kok (2010) have pointed out, the Liberal 
Protestant bloc consisted of the Dutch Reformed, Lutherans, Huguenots, Mennonites, 
and Remonstrants. This is in line with previous literature including Lijphart (1975). We 
therefore amalgamated the Nederlands Hervormden (Dutch Reformed) with the other 
groups. The Roman Catholic group was calculated as the sum of the members of the 
Rooms-Katholieke and members of the very small Oud-Katholieke Kerk. We consider a 
municipality to have been “dominated by the Liberal Protestant pillar” when more than 
65 per cent of its population were Liberal Protestants (N=239). Municipalities in which 
more than 65 per cent were Roman Catholic are labeled as “dominated by the Roman 
Catholic pillar” (N=182). Given the relatively small size of the Orthodox Protestant 
pillar, we apply a different threshold to them. Where more than 35 per cent of a 
municipality’s population were Orthodox Protestants, we classify it as having been 
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“influenced by the Orthodox Protestant pillar” (N=34). Other municipalities were 
classified as “mixed” (N=114). 
For the sake of space, we will use as the labels “predominantly Liberal 
Protestant municipalities”, “Liberal Protestant municipalities”, and “Liberal Protestant 
pillar” as interchangeable in the text (a similar practice will be applied to the other 
pillars). 
Table 1.1. shows how many municipalities belonged to each pillar in the census 
years between 1859 and 1909. The total number of municipalities increased over time.  
 
Table 1.1. Distribution of municipalities with respect to the predominant pillar, by year (%) 
 1859 1869 1879 1889 1899 1909 
Roman Catholic (>65%) 34.2 38.2 38.6 38.0 38.1 39.8 
Liberal Protestant (>65%) 57.4 52.9 52.4 47.7 42.1 37.0 
Orthodox Protestant (>35%) - 0.7 0.7 4.0 5.7 5.8 
Mixed 8.4 8.2 8.3 10.2 14.0 17.4 
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N 396 416 420 421 421 430 
 
It should be noted that a municipality could change its status over time. For 
instance, a municipality that initially comprised mostly Liberal Protestants might then 
become mixed owing to the concentration of Liberal Protestants decreasing to below 65 
per cent, which is the threshold we employ. 
Measures of modernization 
Division of labor. Previous studies of occupational status attainment during 
modernization have emphasized the importance of technological changes in the labor 
market (Zijdeman 2010). Technological changes are important because: (i) they create 
new occupations that have to be filled, which stimulates occupational mobility; (ii) they 
ensure meritocratic selection because it becomes more difficult to pass “how-to” 
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knowledge from a father to a son within a household. That is why previous studies 
focused on variables that measured such technological changes. For instance, Zijdeman 
(2010) employed the number of steam engines purchased per municipality in the 
Netherlands. Unfortunately, these data do not cover the bulk of the period we are 
studying. Therefore, we use another measure that can be derived from our data. We 
compute a measure of division of labor by counting the number of unique occupations 
(HISCO codes of bridegrooms and their fathers) in a region (as van Leeuwen et al. 2016 
does). 
The number of unique occupational titles serves as a proxy of the complexity of 
the labor market. In contrast to all other measures of modernization employed in our 
analysis, this measure is not calculated at the level of a municipality per year, because 
the number of people marrying in a municipality in a given year was sometimes quite 
small. Instead, we calculate it at the level of sub-region per year. There are 36 such sub-
regions in our dataset. These historical regions are similar to the geographical entities 
employed by Dutch sociologists and demographers in contemporary studies (e.g. NUTS 
units or COROPs).  
Educational expansion. Educational expansion is measured as the number of 
pupils enrolled in secondary education (including gymnasia, a type of school that 
prepares pupils for university) in the municipality per 100 inhabitants in a given year. 
These data were derived from the annual reviews on Dutch education (Scholen 1862-
1917). The data were retrieved for each fifth year; estimates were used for the years in 
between. 
Urbanization. Urbanization is measured as the population size of the 
municipality in a given year, divided by 1,000. The data are retrieved from the HED and 
the Historical Database for Dutch Municipalities (HDNG).  
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Mass transportation. In order to measure the development of mass transportation 
facilities, data retrieved from the website stationsweb.nl were used. This website 
contains information on the opening and closing years of all train and steam engine tram 
stations in the Netherlands. The variable indicates the presence of a train and/or a steam 
tram station in a municipality in a given year.  
Mass communication. Mass communication developments are measured by the 
presence of a post office in the municipality in the year of the marriage. This measure 
reflects the ability of individuals to communicate with others by post and to purchase 
newspapers or magazines. The data were retrieved from the annual reports of the Dutch 
postal services, copies of which are held in the archive of the Museum of 
Communication in The Hague (Posterijen 1880-1916). 
Geographical mobility. In a manner similar to Zijdeman (2010), geographical 
mobility was measured as the proportion of immigrants to the total population of the 
municipality. 
Controls. At the individual level, we control for the bridegroom’s age, and 
whether a bridegroom was born in a place other than that of his marriage (we label this 
variable “migrant”). At the contextual level, we will control for marriage year, which is 
measured in years since 1859, divided by 100. Descriptive information for all variables 
is presented in Table 1.2 Additionally, we provide an Appendix with a description of 
the same variables by pillar. 
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Table 1.2. Descriptives of the variables, 1859-1918 (N = 336,357 individuals in 25,356 
municipalities per year) 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Individual characteristics:    
Son’s occupational status 46.93 13.05 10.60-99.00 
Father’s occupational status 47.28 11.59 10.60-99.00 
Son’s age 27.35 5.47 16.00-65.00 
Son is a migrant (born in a place different from the place of marriage) 0.54 - 0/1 
Contextual characteristics:    
Time (years since 1859)/100 0.33 0.17 0.00-0.59 
Denominations:    
 Municipality dominated by Liberal Protestants 0.51 - 0/1 
 Municipality dominated by Roman Catholics 0.25 - 0/1 
 Municipality influenced by Orthodox Protestants 0.02 - 0/1 
 Mixed municipalities 0.22 - 0/1 
Division of labor (number of unique HISCO titles in a region per year)* 52.08 28.82 1.00-160.00 
Educational expansion (pupils per 100 inhabitants) 0.13 0.48 0.00-6.29 
Urbanization (population divided by 1,000) 3.52 5.45 0.19-87.59 
Mass transportation (presence of a train/tram station) 0.26 - 0/1 
Mass communication (presence of a post office) 0.17 - 0/1 
Geographical mobility (proportion of immigrants) 0.06 0.03 0.00-0.57 
Observations in municipalities per year 13.27 24.27 1.00-434.00 
*Minimum value of this variable observed in our data is 1.0. This is because there was only one marriage registered in the sub-
region of Diepenheim (in the province of Overijssel) in 1909. The groom and his father were both farmers (identical HISCO codes 
61220). 
2.4.c. Design 
Hierarchical regression analysis is used for the data analyses. All men are nested 
within municipalities in a given time period (i.e. year of marriage). Conceptually, this 
allocation groups individuals into different contexts that provide opportunities for 
occupational status attainment in terms of religious stratification and economic 
modernization. We will report models with the quadratic term for time since 1859 in 
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order to account for non-linear trends in status inheritance over time (see, for example, 
Figure VIII in the results section): 
 !"# = g%# +	g()*+ℎ-."# + g/0"#+g12345*6+"# + g7839:# +	g;839:ˆ2# + g>2?@:56#	 +	e"+ 	µ#	 	
 
Hierarchical models will estimate the dependent variable !"# 		, which is the 
occupational status of a male i in a specific context j, which is a municipality in a given 
year. The occupational status of males will be modeled as a function of a father’s 
occupational status FathOS, age A, being a migrant Migrant, time since 1885 Time 
(linear and quadratic term), and a vector for all indicators of modernization Modern. 
In all analyses, all continuous variables, except time, are centered on their mean. 
Models will be estimated for the whole sample as well as for different religious pillars 
separately. 
2.5. Results 
We start our analysis with a description of how economic modernization 
progressed in the four types of municipality (figures II to VII). Figure II shows the 
development of the division of labor in the region around a municipality. Although the 
division of labor increased in all types of municipality over time, mixed municipalities 
had higher levels for almost all years. Orthodox Protestant municipalities lagged 
considerably before the 1880s. However, after 1880 the division of labor in these 
municipalities increased significantly, such that they caught up with mixed 
municipalities. Considering municipalities dominated by the Liberal Protestant and the 
Roman Catholic pillars, before 1905 the former showed a slightly higher division of 
labor than the latter. However, after 1905 the trends became very similar, and even 
reversed after 1915.  
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Figure 1.2. Division of labor (number of unique HISCO codes) in the region, by denomination 
of municipality, The Netherlands, 1859-1918 
 
Figure III shows the development of educational expansion across all types of 
municipality. Before 1880, Liberal Orthodox and mixed municipalities were quite 
similar in terms of educational expansion. Then, after some years of decline, a 
significant increase occurred in mixed municipalities after 1900. In contrast to Figure II, 
Roman Catholic municipalities as well as municipalities influenced by Orthodox 
Protestants lagged for almost all years. However, after 1905 they saw some increase in 
educational expansion.  
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Figure 1.3. Educational expansion, by denomination of municipality, The Netherlands, 1859-
1918 
 
Considering urbanization (Figure IV), our data suggest that mixed municipalities 
were the most urbanized parts of the Netherlands that we are studying, for all years. The 
next most urbanized were Liberal Protestant municipalities. As in Figure III on 
educational expansion, Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protestant municipalities ranked 
third and fourth respectively. 
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Figure 1.4. Urbanization, by denomination of municipality, The Netherlands, 1859-1918 
 
In terms of mass transportation (Figure V), all types of municipality witnessed a 
significant improvement. Before 1880, mixed, Roman Catholic, and Liberal Protestant 
municipalities were more or less as likely to have a train or tram station. However, 
mixed municipalities significantly outpaced other municipalities in the following years. 
Liberal Protestant municipalities did so to a lesser extent. The few Orthodox Protestant 
municipalities did not have a train station before 1884, yet they joined the race quite 
successfully after that year. The developments in mass communication were very 
similar to those with respect to mass transportation (Figure VI). 
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Figure 1.5. Mass transportation in the Netherlands, 1859-1918, at municipal level 
 
 
Figure 1.6. Mass communication in the Netherlands, 1859-1918, at municipal level 
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Generally speaking, geographical mobility was higher in Orthodox Protestant 
municipalities than in other types of municipality (Figure VII). However, Roman 
Catholic municipalities witnessed a sharp increase in geographical mobility in the 
twentieth century, becoming the most mobile. Mixed municipalities had relatively high 
levels of geographical mobility before the 1880s. 
 
Figure 1.7. Geographical mobility in the Netherlands, 1859-1918, at municipal level 
 
All in all, our data show that predominantly Liberal Protestant and especially 
mixed municipalities predominated in terms of almost all measures of modernization 
and in most years. Roman Catholic municipalities lagged on most indicators, but the 
differences became less pronounced in the twentieth century. Municipalities influenced 
by Orthodox Protestants showed the lowest scores on our modernization indicators, 
with the exception of the division of labor and geographical mobility. 
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We proceed by showing the correlations between the occupational status of men 
and that of their fathers. Such correlations give some preliminary clues about 
developments in status inheritance in different types of municipality. Figure VIII shows 
average correlations for each type of municipality per year between 1859 and 1918. In 
the case of municipalities influenced by Orthodox Protestants, we start in 1880 because 
of the relatively small numbers of observations before that point.  
 
 
Figure 1.8. Correlations between status of sons and their fathers in four types of municipality in 
the Netherlands, per year, 1859-1918 
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A sharp contrast can be observed between the correlations for fathers and sons in 
Liberal Protestant municipalities and those in Roman Catholic municipalities. In the 
former case, almost all correlations exceed 0.60, whereas in the latter case correlations 
are generally less. On the other hand, the Liberal Protestant municipalities show a 
stronger decline in the correlation in the course of time compared with Roman Catholic 
municipalities. Moreover, in Roman Catholic municipalities the correlations between 
father’s and son’s status initially increased and then – after 1890 – declined. 
Municipalities influenced by Orthodox Protestants witnessed a trend similar to that in 
Roman Catholic municipalities. The variation between years was much stronger for 
them, but that reflected the small number of municipalities of this type. The correlations 
in the mixed municipalities resembled those in Liberal Protestant municipalities. At first 
sight, the divide seems to have been between conservative and liberal municipalities 
instead of between Protestants and Catholics. The question to be investigated in our 
models is to what extent this conclusion holds when we take the hierarchical structure 
of our data into account, control for age and migration status, and explicitly model 
economic modernization. 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 include the results of our hierarchical regression analysis. 
Table III demonstrates the results of the regression of son’s occupational status on 
individual and contextual characteristics for the whole dataset. Table 1.5 shows models 
for each type of municipality separately. 
Model 0 in Table 1.3 estimates the effect of father’s status on son’s status and 
interacts this with time. Model 1 estimates the role of the predominant denomination in 
a municipality on the son’s occupational status as well as differences in the effect of a 
father’s occupational status among the pillars (with the Roman Catholic pillar as the 
reference group). Model 2 estimates the role of economic modernization as well as the 
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effect of the father’s occupational status interacted with each measure of modernization. 
Finally, Model 3 includes all variables simultaneously. 
 
Table 1.3. Hierarchical regression of son’s occupational status on individual and 
contextual characteristics, The Netherlands, 1858-1918 (N = 336,357 individuals in 25,356 
groups) 
 Model 0 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Fixed effects         
Constant 43.626 *** 0.099 42.886 *** 0.108 44.804 *** 0.113 44.171 *** 0.127 
Status groom’s father 0.671 *** 0.005 0.684 *** 0.006 0.667 *** 0.006 0.674 *** 0.006 
*time -0.027 0.038 -0.027 0.038 0.063 0.038 0.058 0.038 
*timeˆ2 -0.274 *** 0.059 -0.254 *** 0.059 -0.296 *** 0.060 -0.291 *** 0.060 
         
time 2.199 ** 0.736 2.281 ** 0.727 0.835 0.715 0.899 0.711 
timeˆ2 6.700 *** 1.186 6.609 *** 1.170 3.848 *** 1.154 4.470 *** 1.149 
         
Denomination:         
 Predominantly Catholic (ref.)         
 Predominantly Lib. Prot.   1.023 *** 0.071   0.730 *** 0.072 
 Influenced Orth. Prot.   0.246  0.186   0.597 *** 0.182 
 Mixed denomination   1.538 *** 0.099   0.723 *** 0.098 
Status groom’s father         
 * Predominantly Lib. Prot.   -0.010 * 0.004   -0.005 0.004 
 * Influenced Orth. Prot.   0.053 *** 0.011   0.040 *** 0.011 
 * Mixed denomination   -0.040 *** 0.005   -0.017 *** 0.005 
         
Division of labor     1.758 *** 0.167 1.274 *** 0.172 
Educational expansion     0.978 *** 0.062 0.961 *** 0.062 
Urbanization     0.049 *** 0.005 0.050 *** 0.005 
Geographical mobility     1.071 0.968 0.789 0.963 
Mass communication     1.620 *** 0.085 1.608 *** 0.085 
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Mass transportation     0.347 *** 0.074 0.361 *** 0.074 
         
Status groom’s father         
* Division of labor     -0.045 *** 0.008 -0.042 *** 0.009 
* Educational expansion     -0.003 0.002 -0.002  0.002 
* Urbanization     0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* Geographical mobility     -0.290 *** 0.051 -0.301 *** 0.051 
* Mass communication     -0.021 *** 0.004 -0.020 *** 0.004 
* Mass transportation     -0.020 *** 0.004 -0.020 *** 0.004 
         
Groom’s age 0.128 *** 0.003 0.132 *** 0.003 0.133 *** 0.003 0.136 *** 0.003 
Groom is migrant 0.929 *** 0.037 0.914 *** 0.037 0.966 *** 0.037 0.957 *** 0.037 
         
Random effects         
R2 (individual level) 0.328 0.328 0.329 0.329 
R2 (contextual level) 0.350 0.358 0.382 0.385 
R2 (total) 0.363 0.367 0.389 0.389 
AIC 2,515,763 2,515,338 2,511,527 2,511,389 
*** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05  
 
Model 0 shows that a son’s status was strongly affected by that of his father, but 
this effect decreased over time. Considering Model 1, we can conclude that men in the 
Roman Catholic pillar (the reference category) on average reached a status of 42.89 in 
1858. This was 43.91 for men who lived in Liberal Protestant municipalities (42.89 + 
1.02); 43.13 for men who lived in municipalities influenced by Orthodox Protestants; 
and 44.42 for men who lived in mixed municipalities. Men thus had a higher status in 
Liberal Protestant and mixed municipalities than in Catholic and Orthodox Protestant 
municipalities, but the differences were not large. 
 With economic modernization, the occupational status of men improved (Model 
2). Economic modernization partly explains the differences in average status between 
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men from the different pillars (Model 3). Whereas, previously, men living in 
municipalities influenced by Orthodox Protestants had an occupational status 
comparable to that of men living in Catholic municipalities, the values for Orthodox 
Protestants were now similar to those for Liberal Protestants and men from mixed 
municipalities (average status 44.76, 44.90, and 44.89 respectively, compared with 
44.17 for Roman Catholics). Thus, men in Orthodox Protestant municipalities tended to 
have a lower occupational status, because these municipalities were less modernized 
than other municipalities. If the opportunities for economic advance had been the same, 
they would have reached (almost) the same status as the inhabitants of Liberal 
Protestant municipalities. The difference with the Catholic municipalities cannot, 
however, be completely explained by the level of modernization. Furthermore, all 
differences were small. 
 We now turn to differences between pillars in the effect of a father’s status on 
his son’s status. Model 1 shows that the effect of a father’s status was weakest in mixed 
communities (in 1858: 0.684 – 0.040 = 0.644) and strongest in Orthodox Protestant 
communities (0.737). This is a substantial difference. For every additional ten points on 
the status scale for fathers, men in Orthodox Protestant communities gained one status 
point more than men in mixed communities. Liberal Protestant and Roman Catholic 
municipalities were in between and did not differ much from each other (the effect of 
father’s status was 0.67 versus 0.68). 
The influence of a father’s status on that of his son was weaker in more modern 
municipalities (Model 2). The more specialized the labor market, the smaller the status 
reproduction over generations. The same is true in municipalities with a post office, a 
train station, and a high rate of immigration. Educational expansion and urbanization do 
not have an independent effect on the strength of the father’s effect. Although the 
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modernization indicators (taken together) explain a significant part of the time trend in 
occupational status, they only partially explain time trend in status reproduction. 
Introducing the modernization indicators to the model also decreases the differences 
between the pillars in terms of the strength of status reproduction. As models 1 and 3 
suggest, the substantial difference of 0.10 between Orthodox Protestant and mixed 
municipalities decreased to 0.06. The difference between Catholic and Liberal 
Protestant municipalities on the one hand and mixed municipalities on the other 
becomes very small (about 0.005). 
In Table 1.4 models are estimated for the four types of municipality separately. 
We test the hypothesis that modernization affected the status attainment of men from 
the different denominations differently. 
 
Table 1.4. Hierarchical regression of son’s occupational status on individual and contextual 
characteristics, The Netherlands, 1859-1918, by religious pillars 
 Model 4 
Predom. Roman Catholic 
municipalities 
Model 5 
Predom. Liberal Protestant 
municipalities 
Model 6 
Municipalities influenced by 
Orthodox Protestants + 
Model 7 
Mixed Municipalities 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. 
Fixed effects         
Constant 44.015 *** 0.283 45.232 *** 0.109 37.743 *** 2.100 45.304 *** 0.245 
Status groom’s father 0.684 *** 0.015 0.667 *** 0.007 0.718 *** 0.187 0.706 *** 0.016 
*time 0.021 0.091 0.004 0.050 1.556 * 0.741 0.010 0.090 
*timeˆ2 -0.366 ** 0.148 -0.177 * 0.081 -1.774 * 0.872 -0.237 0.130 
         
time 4.789 *** 1.565 -0.482 0.704 23.661 ** 8.226 -3.921 ** 1.509 
timeˆ2 1.125 2.582 4.930 *** 1.156 -14.274 9.735 10.574 *** 2.262 
         
Division of labor 1.643 *** 0.427 1.597 *** 0.165 0.142 0.870 1.105 *** 0.316 
Educational expansion 0.451 * 0.190 1.132 *** 0.053 -0.570 0.572 0.920 *** 0.084 
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Urbanization 0.108 *** 0.015 0.045 *** 0.005 0.049 0.095 0.019 *** 0.005 
Geographical mobility -8.350 *** 2.188 2.520 ** 0.977 -18.211 *** 7.254 13.911 *** 1.908 
Mass communication 1.634 *** 0.206 1.475 *** 0.080 1.154 *** 0.393 1.743 *** 0.148 
Mass transportation 0.084 0.164 0.399 *** 0.074 1.505 *** 0.326 0.650 *** 0.141 
         
Status groom’s father         
* Division of labor 0.023 0.025 -0.022 *** 0.165 -0.332 *** 0.080 -0.088 *** 0.017 
* Educational expansion 0.017 * 0.007 -0.005  0.053 -0.026 0.047 -0.001 0.004 
* Urbanization -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.005 0.040 *** 0.008 0.001 *** 0.000 
* Geographical mobility -0.570 *** 0.105 -0.304 ** 0.977 0.779 0.640 -0.155 0.138 
* Mass communication -0.007 0.010 -0.018 *** 0.080 -0.081 *** 0.035 -0.002 0.010 
* Mass transportation 0.012 0.010 -0.010  0.074 0.007 0.029 -0.097 *** 0.010 
         
Groom’s age 0.147 *** 0.007 0.119 *** 0.004 0.335 *** 0.028 0.146 *** 0.007 
Groom is migrant 0.312 *** 0.077 1.169 *** 0.049 1.279 *** 0.308 1.139 *** 0.080 
         
Random effects         
R2 (individual level) 0.276 0.358 0.327 0.329 
R2 (contextual level) 0.279 0.506 0.397 0.562 
R2 (total) 0.325 0.413 0.353 0.396 
AIC 632,039 1,271,089 57,201 551,484 
N individuals 83,546 171,887 7,508 73,416 
N contexts 9,711 11,841 795 3,009 
*** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05  
+ The results for this pillar are for 1868-1918; before 1868 there were no municipalities with more than 35% Orthodox Protestants. 
 
In order to make clear what the total effect of modernization is on the status of 
men in each pillar, we look at both moderate and larger values of modernization for 
each measure (see Table 1.5). 
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Table 1.5. Moderate and larger values of modernization  
(centered for continuous variables) 
 Moderate values of modernization Larger values of modernization 
Division of labor -0.22 0.18 
Educational expansion -0.53 0.24 
Urbanization - 9.99 0.21 
Geographical mobility -0.02 0.01 
Mass communication 0 1 
Mass transportation 0 1 
 
For example, the difference between the predicted status of men who lived in 
predominantly Roman Catholic communities with moderate and high levels of 
modernization is respectively: 
 
For moderate: 42.490 = 44.015 - (0.22*1.643) - (0.53*0.451) – (9.99*0.108) + (0.02 * 8.35) + (0*1.634) + (0*0.084) 
For large: 46.053 = 44.015 + (0.18*1.643) + (0.24*0.451) + (0.21*0.108) - (0.01 * 8.35) + (1*1.634) + (1*0.084) 
Difference: 46.053 – 42.490 = 3.563 
 
This difference means that the average status of men from the Roman Catholic 
pillar increased by 3.5 points when the degree of modernization changed from moderate 
to high. The same numbers were 3.9, 2.2, and 4.2 for men from Liberal Protestant, 
Orthodox Protestant, and mixed communities respectively. Modernization thus 
increased the status of men in mixed and Liberal Protestant communities most and in 
Orthodox Protestant communities least. 
It was only for Liberal Protestant and mixed municipalities that all indicators of 
economic modernization increased the status of men. In contrast, in Roman Catholic 
and Orthodox Protestant municipalities, the influence of geographical mobility was 
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negative. Furthermore, mass transportation did not have an effect in Roman Catholic 
municipalities; and the division of labor, educational expansion, and urbanization did 
not have an effect in Orthodox Protestant municipalities. 
Considering the influence of modernization on status inheritance, in Roman 
Catholic pillars it was quite modest: 
For moderate: 0.690 = 0.684 - (0.22*0.023) - (0.53*0.017) + (9.99*0.001) + (0.02 * 0.570) + (0*0.007) + (0*0.012) 
For large: 0.689 = 0.684 + (0.18*0.023) + (0.24*0.017) - (0.21*0.001) - (0.01 * 0.570) - (1*0.007) + (1*0.012) 
Difference: 0.689-0.690 = -0.001 
 
This small difference (of -0.001) means that modernization was associated with 
a very small decrease in status inheritance among men who lived in a predominantly 
Roman Catholic community. This decrease was more salient in Liberal Protestant (-
0.060) and especially mixed communities (-0.13). In contrast, modernization increased 
status inheritance for men who lived in Orthodox Protestant municipalities (increase of 
0.21). 
Our hierarchical models partially confirm the intuition derived from correlations 
of statuses in the course of time (Figure VIII). Indeed, we find that status inheritance 
followed the inverse U-shaped curve pattern in Orthodox Protestant pillars. However, 
we do not find this for the Roman Catholic pillars. For example, in 1880 in an Orthodox 
Protestant community the influence of the father’s status was 0.967 = 0.718 + (0.21 * 
1.556) - (1.774* 0.21ˆ2); in 1890 it increased to 1.030; in 1918 it decreased to 1.019. In 
contrast to this curvilinear relationship, Roman Catholic communities witnessed a 
steadier decline in parental status over time: 0.678, 0.629, and 0.554 respectively. 
Table 1.5 also shows that four out of six indicators weakened the influence of 
father’s status in Liberal Protestant municipalities. In contrast, only two indicators did 
so in each of the other municipalities. A further division of labor weakened the 
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influence of father’s status in all pillars except the Roman Catholic one. Mass 
communication weakened the influence of father’s status in the Liberal and Orthodox 
Protestant pillars. Mass transportation weakened the influence of fathers’ status only in 
mixed municipalities. Considering urbanization and geographical mobility, these 
weakened the influence of father’s status in municipalities predominantly inhabited by 
Liberal Protestants and Roman Catholics. A similar “crowding” effect has been 
observed before (Knigge et al. 2014). It has been explained in terms of the 
“anonymization mechanism”, which claims that with an increasing population and 
geographical mobility employers are less likely to know one’s family background, 
decreasing the possibility of favoritism. Our findings, however, show that this was the 
case only for Liberal Protestants and Roman Catholics (which together form the 
majority of all municipalities). In mixed and Orthodox municipalities urbanization 
increased the influence of fathers. It seems that Orthodox Protestants responded to 
growing labor competition by relying more strongly on their family background. In the 
case of mixed municipalities, it could be that competition between those pillars 
stimulated closure and social control between but also within the labor markets. 
We summarize our findings with respect to our hypotheses in Table 1.6, and will 
discuss them below. 
 
 
Table 1.6. Summary of the hypotheses and results 
Hypotheses on differences in  1. Economic success (status) 
 2. Intergenerational mobility 
 3. The effect of modernization on economic success 
 4. The effect of modernization on intergenerational mobility 
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Weberian hypothesis:  
Conservatism hypothesis: 
Modernization hypothesis: 
Lib Prot + Orth Prot > Cath 
Lib Prot > Orth Prot + Cath  
Smaller differences after taking modernization into account 
 
Differences between men from municipalities dominated by different denominations 
Finding before taking modernization into account:  Lib Prot > Orth Prot + Cath, 
 differences not substantial 
Finding after taking modernization into account:  Lib Prot + Orth Prot > Cath, 
 differences not substantial 
Conclusion: No substantial differences, therefore none of the hypotheses supported. 
Differences in intergenerational mobility between men from municipalities dominated by different denominations 
Finding before taking modernization into account:  Lib Prot + Cath >> Orth Prot 
Finding after taking modernization into account:  Lib Prot + Cath > Orth Prot 
Conclusion: Men in Orthodox Protestant municipalities showed less intergenerational mobility. After controlling for modernization, 
differences become smaller. Therefore, partial support for the conservatism and modernization hypotheses. 
Differences in the effect of modernization on economic success between men from municipalities dominated by different 
denominations 
Finding: Lib Prot + Cath > Orth Prot 
Conclusion: Although modernization influenced economic success of men in all types of community, this effect was much weaker in 
communities dominated by Orthodox Protestants. Therefore, partial support for the conservatism hypothesis. 
Differences in the effect of modernization on intergenerational mobility between men from municipalities dominated by 
different denominations 
Finding: Lib Prot >> Cath + Orth Prot 
Conclusion: Modernization had no influence on intergenerational mobility in Catholic municipalities; modernization decreased mobility 
in Orthodox Protestant municipalities; modernization increased intergenerational mobility in Liberal Protestant municipalities. 
Therefore, more support for conservatism. 
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2.6. Conclusions 
In our study, we contrasted the Weberian hypothesis on differences in economic 
success among members of different denominations with an alternative hypothesis that 
emphasizes differences between denominations with respect to conservatism. According 
to the Weberian hypothesis, Protestants should be characterized by greater economic 
success, more intergenerational mobility, and a stronger influence of modernization 
processes on status attainment and status reproduction. According to the conservatism 
hypothesis, the divide is between Liberal Protestants on the one hand and Catholics and 
Orthodox Protestants on the other. Alternatively, the differences among the 
denominations were caused by increasing economic modernization and should 
disappear when the level of modernization is taken into account. In general, our results 
are most in line with the conservatism hypothesis. We also find some support for the 
economic modernization hypothesis. 
In the Netherlands in the second half of the nineteenth century, the religious 
denominations did not substantially differ with respect to economic success, as 
measured by average occupational status. Having said that, Liberal Protestants lived in 
municipalities that were on average more modernized than the municipalities dominated 
by Catholics or influenced by Orthodox Protestants. Status reproduction, however, was 
clearly stronger in Orthodox Protestant municipalities than in municipalities dominated 
by the other denominations. This particular distinction was not expected by either of our 
hypotheses. It is caused partly by differences between these municipalities with respect 
to modernization – supporting the modernization hypothesis – but some of the extensive 
status reproduction among Orthodox Protestants remains. In line with the conservatism 
mechanism, this can be explained by the fact that the new pillar of Orthodox Protestants 
emerged as one of the strongholds of traditionalism in the late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth centuries. People raised in this environment discouraged social and 
technological innovation. Therefore, we think it reasonable to assume that both 
employees and employers were likely to value ascribed social status and predictable 
career paths over the turbulence of modernization. 
Moreover, our findings suggest that the economic success of Liberal Protestants 
was more strongly affected by modernization than the economic success of other 
denominations. This is also reflected in the greater likelihood of sons of Liberal 
Protestants having an occupation with a different status than that of their father. We 
observe that communities with Orthodox Protestants were less mobile compared with 
other communities. This difference between the Orthodox Protestant pillar on the one 
hand and the Liberal Protestant pillar on the other was expected in our hypothesis. 
However, the difference between the Orthodox Protestant pillar and the Roman Catholic 
one was not. It seems that changes in the occupational mobility of Orthodox Protestants 
in stressing parental influence and extending parental control was a specific reaction to 
ongoing economic modernization. Moreover, we find that, after controlling for 
modernization, status inheritance in such places followed the inverse U-shaped trend 
over the decades. In other words, Orthodox Protestants firstly reacted to modernization 
by extending parental control, but over time this effect became weaker. We can 
tentatively assume that acceptance of different aspects of modernization, including 
changes in the labor market and dissemination of the ideas of meritocracy, took time. 
Perhaps what we are observing in our data is that the initial reaction among Orthodox 
Protestants to economic modernization was reactionary, but that over time they adopted 
the ways in which other pillars behaved. The time lag could be explained by the closed 
nature of pillars. 
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All in all, our data confirm that there was a significant difference in the process 
of status attainment by Dutch men between Liberal and Orthodox Protestant 
communities; this difference was explained by their relationship to modernization. 
Catholics often take the middle position. This finding contrasts with the earlier view 
that such difference should be exclusively between Protestants and Catholics. Some 
cautionary remarks regarding our study should be discussed as well. We have studied 
only married men living in five Dutch provinces. Although our data cover a variety of 
municipalities that represented all pillars, some of the provinces that were essential for 
trade and finance (such as Noord-Holland and Zuid-Holland) are not included. 
Moreover, the interplay between economic modernization and pillarization could have 
yielded different outcomes for women. Traditionalism and conservatism might have had 
a stronger grip on them. It is therefore possible that we have underestimated the 
influence of conservatism. We believe that future studies should expand the collection 
of the data to cover these issues. 
Our study improves on two classic research traditions in economics and 
sociology: (i) relating religion to individual economic performance; (ii) relating 
economic modernization to occupational status attainment. The literature had already 
cast some doubt on the argument that Protestantism as devotion was the key explanation 
of economic success after the Reformation. Instead, early investments in human capital 
and technological innovations have been suggested as alternative explanations (Becker 
and Woessmann 2009; McCloskey 2010; Akçomak, Webbink, and ter Weel 2016; 
Mokyr 2016). We add to this literature by stressing the differences between religious 
denominations with respect to a traditionalistic and conservative culture (i.e. pillars). In 
the Netherlands, such cultural differences were generated and maintained within pillars, 
and we have shown that they were important especially for the acceptance of 
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modernization processes. Although pillarization was connected to religious cleavages, it 
went beyond our traditional understanding of denominational segregation, i.e. 
Protestants on the one side and Catholics on the other. Dutch Protestants were divided 
between those groups of a more liberal and conservative character, known as the Liberal 
Protestant pillar and the Orthodox Protestant pillar respectively. Social interactions 
between members of different pillars were rare. Therefore, the process of social 
diffusion of innovations (both technical and social) was constrained. The social 
cleavages between these groups stimulated a divergence in terms of economic 
modernization as well as in terms of individual occupational status attainment. 
Therefore, we argue that, although economic modernization affected the occupational 
attainment of all Dutch men in the long run, the process of pillarization caused this to 
happen in a different pace for different pillars. This finding also adds to the social 
stratification literature. Cultural differences within a country explain part of the 
differences in status reproduction that seem at first sight unconnected to modernization 
processes. In hindsight, these differences reflect the different rate of acceptance of 
economic modernization by more liberal and more conservative groups. 
Considering a broader application of our findings, social change is a process that 
might meet resistance. Individuals who witness various social innovations face a 
dilemma: whether to reproduce the traditional way of life (following the templates 
created in the past) or to take the path of social change (Greif 2006; McCloskey 2010). 
We argue that the specific religious stratification of Dutch society (i.e. pillarization) 
influenced the outcome of this dilemma. Our analysis of individual and contextual 
historical data informs the literature on economic development, showing the empirical 
case of resilience to innovation based on cultural closure among religious communities. 
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Appendix 
Table 1.1a. Descriptives, 1859-1918, Catholic pillar (83,546 individuals in 9,711 municipalities 
per year) 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Individual characteristics:    
Son’s occupational status 46.42 13.03 10.60-99.00 
Father’s occupational status 47.87 10.54 10.60-99.00 
Son’s age 28.36 5.33 16.00-65.00 
Son is a migrant (born in a place different from the place of marriage) 0.50 - 0/1 
Contextual characteristics:    
Time (since 1859 in decades)/100 0.34 0.17 0.00-0.59 
Division of labor (number of unique HISCO titles in a region per year) 50.99 24.25 9.00-148.00 
Educational expansion (pupils per 100 inhabitants) 0.08 0.35 0.00-4.40 
Urbanization (population divided by 1,000) 2.83 4.40 0.22-66.48 
Mass transportation (presence of a train/tram station) 0.25 - 0/1 
Mass communication (presence of a post office) 0.13 - 0/1 
Geographical mobility (proportion of immigrants) 0.05 0.03 0.00-0.57 
Observations in municipality per year 8.60 13.57 1.00-216.00 
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Table 1.1b. Descriptives, 1859-1918, Liberal Protestant pillar 
 (171,887 individuals in 11,841 municipalities per year) 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Individual characteristics:    
Son’s occupational status 46.24 12.78 10.60-99.00 
Father’s occupational status 46.61 11.67 10.60-99.00 
Son’s age 27.10 5.52 16.00-65.00 
Son is a migrant (born in a place different from the place of marriage) 0.53 - 0/1 
Contextual characteristics:    
Time (since 1859 in decades)/100 0.30 0.17 0.00-0.59 
Division of labor (number of unique HISCO titles in a region per year)* 53.64 29.53 1.00-159.00 
Educational expansion (pupils per 100 inhabitants) 0.13 0.49 0.00-6.29 
Urbanization (population divided by 1,000) 3.56 4.54 0.19-67.56 
Mass transportation (presence of a train/tram station) 0.24 - 0/1 
Mass communication (presence of a post office) 0.17 - 0/1 
Geographical mobility (proportion of immigrants) 0.06 0.03 0.00-0.56 
Observations in municipality per year 14.16 22.91 1.00-434.00 
*Minimum value of this variable observed in our data is 1.0. This is because there was only one marriage registered in the sub-
region of Diepenheim (in the province of Overijssel) in 1909. The groom and his father were both farmers (identical HISCO codes 
61220). 
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Table 1.1c. Descriptives, 1869-1918, Orthodox Protestant pillar (7,508 individuals in 795 
municipalities per year) 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Individual characteristics:    
Son’s occupational status 44.94 13.60 10.60-99.00 
Father’s occupational status 45.42 11.14 10.60-99.00 
Son’s age 26.14 4.52 16.00-61.00 
Son is a migrant (born in a place different from the place of marriage) 0.75 - 0/1 
Contextual characteristics:    
Time (since 1859 in decades)/100 0.44 0.11 0.09-0.59 
Division of labor (number of unique HISCO titles in a region per year) 61.16 25.48 12.00-131.00 
Educational expansion (pupils per 100 inhabitants) 0.05 0.21 0.00-1.56 
Urbanization (population divided by 1,000) 3.11 1.55 0.54-8.32 
Mass transportation (presence of a train/tram station) 0.26 - 0/1 
Mass communication (presence of a post office) 0.11 - 0/1 
Geographical mobility (proportion of immigrants) 0.07 0.02 0.01-0.28 
Observations in municipality per year 9.44 6.35 1.00-36.00 
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Table 1.1d. Descriptives, 1869-1918, Mixed (73,416 individuals in 3,009 municipalities per 
year) 
 Mean S.D. Range 
Individual characteristics:    
Son’s occupational status 49.32 13.35 10.60-99.00 
Father’s occupational status 48.40 12.42 10.60-99.00 
Son’s age 26.88 5.42 16.00-65.00 
Son is a migrant (born in a place different from the place of marriage) 0.56 - 0/1 
Contextual characteristics:    
Time (since 1859 in decades)/100 0.40 0.15 0.00-0.59 
Division of labor (number of unique HISCO titles in a region per year) 61.12 27.84 12.00-160 
Educational expansion (pupils per 100 inhabitants) 0.28 0.75 0.00-4.77 
Urbanization (population divided by 1,000) 5.97 9.98 0.53-87.59 
Mass transportation (presence of a train/tram station) 0.37 - 0/1 
Mass communication (presence of a post office) 0.30 - 0/1 
Geographical mobility (proportion of immigrants) 0.06 0.04 0.00-0.57 
Observations in municipality per year 24.40 45.95 1.00-432 
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3. Chapter 2. The long-term effects of religious markets, religious tradition, and 
institutions: secularization in the Netherlands in 1909 and the 2000s 
 
Abstract: Religious market theory states that church completion increases religious 
participation. However, this theory has met considerable resistance in recent decades. We offer 
a synthesis of religious market, ecological, and path-dependency perspectives in order to answer 
whether Protestant and Catholic religious markets in 1909 influence religious affiliations in the 
Netherlands today. We argue that the formation of a religious market was only possible in 
municipalities that were mostly Protestant due to the combination of the greater individualism 
that characterizes the Protestant doctrine (i.e. a freer demand) and the existence of two 
Protestant churches that competed for the congregation (a differentiated supply). These 
conditions were absent in predominantly Catholic municipalities, where the combination of 
pillarization and doctrinal hierarchy actually hindered secularization. We show empirically that 
these historically-specific characteristics measured in the early 20th century have an enduring 
impact on current levels of religiosity after controlling for a host of contextual and individual 
characteristics.  
 
3.1. Introduction 
The status of religious market theory (RMT) has changed dramatically in 
sociology in the span of a decade. RMT has shifted from being described as one of the 
most influential theories of religious participation (Norris and Inglehart 2011) and the 
“new paradigm” (Warner 1993) to be considered, at best, one explanation of religious 
participation that is valid only in a limited number of cases (Chaves and Gorski 2001). 
Originally, RMT was developed to explain religious vitality in the US as a consequence 
of competitive and unregulated religious markets (Iannaccone, Finke, and Start 1997; 
Stark and Bainbridge 1987; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000; Warner 
1993). The religious market framework soon met significant resistance. Many scholars 
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have pointed out that the demand for religious products is not constant and depends on a 
variety of personal and contextual factors including the levels of religious socialization, 
existential security, previous religious tradition, educational development, and 
individualization (Kelley and de Graaf 1997; Norris and Inglehart 2011; Ruiter and Van 
Tubergen 2009; van Ingen and Moor 2015). Others have questioned the historical 
plausibility of the concept of religious markets per se (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Gorski 
2000; Lechner 1996). Finally, a significant share of criticism has arrived from empirical 
studies. A review of 26 empirical papers that contained 193 analyses shows that 
competitive religious markets rarely increased religious participation (Chaves and 
Gorski 2001). Moreover, the empirical measures typically employed to test RMT have 
been questioned by Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002) who for this reason disregard a 
significant body of previous findings.  
Nevertheless, there is still room for debate. Frank Lechner (2007) conducted an 
extensive review of the religious market literature and pointed out that both adherents 
and critics of this theory agree on the following three points: (i) that RMT has not been 
completely rejected but rather put on hold waiting for greater theoretical clarification 
and better empirical scrutiny; (ii) that the influence of religious markets should be 
studied by bringing in the social context in which these markets allegedly operate (i.e. 
the “ecological perspective”); and (iii) that the institutions that shaped religious markets 
were formed back in history, and hence a proper test of the RMT also requires taking a 
historical perspective (i.e. the “path-dependency” perspective). To our best knowledge, 
these theoretical points have not been advanced empirically. 
In this paper, we aim to revisit RMT by theorizing and testing the specific 
institutional and doctrinal conditions that made the formation of religious markets 
plausible in the course of history. We offer a synthesis of the religious market, 
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ecological and path-dependency perspectives to explain religious participation in the 
Netherlands, a country that has been at the center of the debates about RMT. Our 
research shows that religious participation in the Netherlands can indeed be explained 
by church competition (which is the core element of RMT) but only under very specific 
historical conditions, i.e. the conditions that enable the formation of religious markets. 
We argue these conditions were only met in the Netherlands in predominantly 
Protestant regions and this for the following two reasons. First, because by fostering the 
individualization of the religious experience, the Protestant doctrine allowed for the 
formation of religious “consumers”; and second, because the split of the Protestant 
Church provided these consumers with a differentiated supply. We note that the specific 
Dutch institution of pillarization probably made it unlikely that these new consumers 
crossed the Protestant camp and hence religious markets were mostly intra-Protestant 
markets. Equivalent markets did not emerge in the Roman Catholic camp because the 
religious supply for Catholics was not differentiated (i.e. there was only one Catholic 
Church) while the specific doctrinal characteristics of Roman Catholicism hindered (or 
delayed) the formation of religious consumers. For these reasons, more competition in 
predominantly Catholic regions meant the presence of the Protestant Church. Such 
presence, we argue, could have reinforced Catholics’ identities in predominantly 
Catholic regions thus strengthening (rather than weakening) the links between the 
Roman Catholic Church and its congregation. Mostly Catholic regions with Protestant 
presence could have therefore better resisted secularization trends. These processes 
were largely facilitated by pillarization.   
Pillarization is a specific Dutch institution that existed in the Netherlands 
approximately from the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twenty century 
and which organized many central aspects of the social life across major religious 
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organizations (i.e. “pillars”). Pillars provided people with education, work and leisure, 
as well as with a strong feeling of pillar-based identity. The fact that both Protestant and 
Catholic communities reinforced their worldviews and practices in isolation from each 
other exacerbated their doctrinal differences and, we argue, played a fundamental role in 
explaining how church fragmentation influenced religious participation in different 
directions in different regions. 
Because religious markets are institutions shaped by history and because 
religious (and secular) beliefs are transmitted over generations, current levels of 
secularization could be explained by these specific historical developments that took 
place in the past. Extant studies typically address the effect of religious markets on 
people’s religiosity either in the past or in the present (see e.g. Boone et al. 2011; 
Iannaccone, Haight, and Rubin 2011; Finke, Guest, and Start 1996; Voas, Olson, and 
Crockett 2002), yet there are very few studies that seek to explain the present religious 
behavior by looking at the past (but see Dekker and Ester 1996; Olav 2010). We 
investigate the shadow of history over present-day levels of religious participation in the 
Netherlands by merging unique historical data for 1909 with survey data from 2002 to 
2008. This, we claim, is an important contribution of this study.  
By studying the Netherlands, we also hope to contribute to the classic debates in 
the field of religious change and religious markets. The case of the Netherlands has 
appeared systematically on both sides of this debate since the late 80s (Lechner 1989; 
Lechner 1996; Stark and Iannaccone, 1996; Lechner 2007). It is therefore a critical case 
for the sociology of religion. Our approach conciliates RMT with Lechner’s emphasis 
on path-dependency and social context.  In so doing, we claim, it provides a better 
understanding of the formation of religious markets. We stress such markets appear 
only under very specific social conditions and warn against interpreting Church 
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concentration/fragmentation as a sign of market forces. This analytical approach is in 
itself another important contribution of this study.  
A final contribution of this study is methodological. Voas, Olson and Crockett 
(2002) demonstrated that there is a mathematical association between standard measures 
of religious competition and religious vitality that produces non-zero correlations. This 
association is driven by spurious variation in denominational size. This means the 
association between measures of competition and religious vitality often reported in the 
literature could actually be spurious. Voas, Olson and Crockett (2002) propose to 
employ bootstrapping simulations to detect the incidence of such spurious results. Using 
their method, we show that our estimates of the correlation between past religious 
fragmentation and present religious vitality are not spuriously driven by variation in 
denominational size. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief review 
of the literature on RMT and places our contribution in theoretical context. Section III 
introduces the Dutch case in historical perspective by briefly discussing pillarization, 
religious tradition and path-dependency. Section IV presents the data, variables and 
analytical strategy. Findings are presenting in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes 
and discusses the analyses' results.   
3.2. Challenging the church competition argument: a brief review of the literature 
The theory of religious markets represents the supply-side explanation of 
religious participation. RMT draws particular attention on church competition and state 
regulations of religious organizations (Iannaccone, Finke, and Start 1997; Stark and 
Bainbridge 1987; Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000; Warner 1993). 
According to this line of thought, religious organizations are responsible for inducing 
peoples’ church attendance and religious attitudes. This is the case because of two main 
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factors. First, competition generates incentives for churches to be active. Without 
competition churches tend to act as “lazy firms” which do not engage their 
congregations. Second, people may have different preferences for religious products. 
Therefore, a more differentiated supply of churches is necessary to cater all potential 
religious needs. Otherwise, people will shun formal religion and satisfy their needs with 
close substitutes among secular products. This theory has generated a vast array of 
theoretical and empirical papers, thus deserving the title of the “new paradigm” in 
sociology of religion (Warner 1993). 
Despite the short-term success of this theory, RMT has been widely challenged 
in the course of the years. First, many scholars have contested one of its basic 
theoretical assumptions, namely that demand for religious products is largely constant. 
In fact, most scholars agree religious demand is not constant as it depends on a variety 
of personal and contextual factors. For instance, individual wellbeing and existential 
security reduces the personal need for religious reassurance (Norris and Inglehart 2011; 
Immerzeel and Van Tubergen 2011). Moreover, the evolution of scientific-based 
rational worldviews, individualization and modern consumerist practices have all 
reduced the demand for religious products in developed societies (Hirschle 2011; 
Hirschle 2013; Ruiter and van Tubergen 2009; van Ingen and Moor 2015). Finally, the 
expansion of secular education, the demise of religious socialization within families  
together with generational replacement has reduced the demand for religiosity in many 
Western societies (Kelley and de Graaf 1997; Voas and Chaves 2016). 
Second, many scholars have employed historical arguments in order to 
disqualify RMT (Gorski 2000). The historical literature has questioned the very 
existence of religious markets, i.e. social spaces where individuals were able to choose 
amongst preferable religious products and consume them individually and freely 
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(Lechner 1996; Chaves and Gorski 2001). It has been argued, for instance, that it was 
the local rulers of many Premodern Western European localities who decided the 
religious affiliation on behalf of their subjects after the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 – an 
arrangement known as cuius regio, eius religio (Becker, Pfaff, and Rubin 2016). 
Religious consumption was a collective act, and choosing an alternative supplier was 
most difficult and very frequently restricted by geographical and political circumstances 
(Chaves and Gorski 2001). This why Modern Western societies inherently developed 
“religious oligopolies” rather than “religious markets” (Lechner 1996).  
Third, meta-analysis of the literature shows that the relationship between 
religious markets (or at least fragmentation) and religious participation may take various 
forms depending on the specific context (Chaves and Gorski 2001). This point has been 
made both from a theoretical and a methodological angle. Considering the theoretical 
criticism, many scholars have stressed that both religious markets and individual 
religiosity are embedded in the broader context of social institutions (Ammerman 1997; 
Lechner 1996). Therefore, it is theoretically more appealing and efficient to study such 
institutions directly. Often times the lack of expected correlations could be better 
understood when confounding contextual variables such as e.g. urbanization or religious 
regulations are taken into account (McBride 2008; 2010). Other scholars have pointed 
out that the presence of church competition is not exactly the same as the absence of 
church concentration.  For example, when a single church dominates in a given society 
it might actually fuel the resistance of the secular population and push people away 
from it (Achterberg et al 2009; Ribberink, Achterberg, and Houtman 2011). This 
argument does not employ the logic of “lazy firms” and yet it predicts the same 
outcome at the macro-level. Therefore, the same statistical association between 
oligopoly and secularization is explained by a different theoretical mechanism.  
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Considering methodological criticisms, there are some fundamental flaws in the 
way scholars used to analyze the link between religious markets and religious 
participation. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index is the common measure to study 
competition in religious markets (Barro and McCleary 2003). Yet scholars have often 
misused this index in their statistical analysis (see Voas, Olson, and Crockett 2002). We 
turn to this point below. 
Can RMT be saved? 
Despite all the above criticisms, the theory of religious markets has not been 
completely dismissed. RMT has inspired many supply-side studies of religiosity, many 
of which go beyond church competition per se. For example, scholars have successfully 
investigated religious regulation (Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009), religious persecution 
(Grim and Finke 2007), and state-church competition for public good provision (Gruber 
and Hungerman 2005; Gruber and Hungerman 2006; Hungerman 2005).  Moreover, 
defenders of RCT offered new formal models in reaction to the above-mentioned 
criticisms (see e.g. Montgomery 2003; McBride 2008) and looked for better data and 
measures to test church competition (e.g. Olav 2010; Van Tubergen and Sindradottir 
2011).  One may suggest that replicating previous studies with better theories and 
methods could be a strategy to solve fundamental problems discovered by the critics. 
We build our motivation to reinforce the church competition argument on the 
writings of Frank Lechner (2007) who has been one of the most prominent critics of the 
religious market framework. Lechner conducted an extensive review of the religious 
market literature and pointed out that both adherents and critics of this theory agree on 
the following three points. First, the theory of religious markets has not been rejected 
but rather put on hold “until quantitative studies become more refined” (Lechner 2007, 
88); Second, both sides of the debate agree that religious markets do not have uniform 
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effects but their influence is actually moderated by structural conditions (i.e. “ecological 
perspective”); and, finally, religious markets are the products of institutions that were 
shaped in the past. This notion of path dependency is, however, not yet fully 
incorporated into the literature on religious markets (Lechner 2007, 94). 
Religious markets must be therefore placed in the broader context of social 
institutions (McBride’s 2008). Because these institutions logically evolve over time, 
social context means also historical context. Below we offer a synthesis of the religious 
market, ecological, and path-dependency perspectives in order to explain religious 
change in the Netherlands. 
3.3. The role of religious tradition, pillarization and path-dependency in the 
Netherlands 
Religious traditions 
Sociological scholarship has pointed out that religious change largely depends 
on the predominant religious culture (Norris and Inglehart 2011). Some religious 
traditions are more fragile to secularization than others because they favor individualism 
and accept the separation between the church and the state. Predominant religious 
cultures have enduring effects.  
Protestantism was forged during the Reformation and sought to rebel against the 
authority of the Roman Catholic Church. This specific line of opposition influenced the 
identities and the social organization of both religious groups. Protestants developed 
various practices and social institutions in order to reduce the role of church hierarchy. 
For instance, to undermine the role of priests as mediators in reading the Bible, 
Protestants promoted mass literacy and mass printing (Becker, Pfaff, and Rubin 2016; 
Becker and Woessmann 2009; Woodberry 2012). Furthermore, the social and 
ideological organization of Protestants favored the separation between political and 
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economic power as well as the rule of law. This decreased the role of the church in the 
public and political spheres (Gorski 1993; Woodberry 2012). Since Dutch Protestants 
were less dependent on the church hierarchy than Roman Catholics, their decisions with 
respect to family formation and reproduction became more individualistic and rational 
and less dependent on the influence of the church (Hendrickx, Lammers, and Ultee 
1991; Van Bavel and Kok 2004; Van Bavel and Kok 2010).  
The very idea of church competition implies that religious organizations 
compete for congregations and people decide which church to join based on their 
personal religious preferences. Hence competition requires “free” consumers and a 
differentiated supply. Lechner (1996) argues that the Netherlands were split into 
religious “oligopolies” that did not compete with each other. This division is known in 
the literature as pillarization (Lijphart 1968). Each church provided individuals with a 
full set of social institutions: education, work, and leisure. Moreover, pillarization 
implied a strong feeling of pillar-based identity (Dekker and Ester 1996). This 
concentration of church power was very similar to what Becker, Pfaff, and Rubin 
(2016) defined as incontestable market with a true religious monopolist. Pillarization, 
Lechner argued, prevented the formation of religious markets. 
Yet by the end of the 19th century, a group of fundamentalist Protestants split 
into a separate church, the Re-Reformed Protestants, increasing religious competition in 
traditionally Protestant regions (Van Bavel and Kok, 2010). We argue that this split in 
combination with the specific doctrinal features of Protestant might have generated an 
intra-doctrinal religious market in mostly Protestant regions even in the face of 
pillarization. Dutch men and women who lived in regions dominated by Protestants 
became less attached to the power of a single church by 1909 and may have developed 
into a religious demand, while the intra-doctrinal split within the Protestant camp might 
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have generated a differentiated “Protestant” supply. Both processes are obviously not 
independent of each other. Together, they might have evolved into what Stark and 
Innaccone (1994) would call a ‘competitive religious market’ where competition 
hampers secularization. In contrast individuals living in Protestant regions with little or 
none intra-doctrinal competition could have been more prone to secularization.  
No such intra-doctrinal markets ever developed in mostly Catholic regions 
where the Roman Church retained its monopoly. We expect Lechner’s argument to 
apply fully in this case because 1) the hierarchical nature of Roman Catholicism 
prevented the formation of religious consumers and, 2) because pillarization hindered 
inter-doctrinal competition. The Catholic Church could have better retained its 
congregation in the face of modernization and other secularization trends because of its 
hierarchical nature. Hence in mostly Catholic regions, fragmentation (i.e. the presence 
of Protestant churches) did not imply competition, i.e. Lechner argument applies. 
Our own descriptive historical evidence suggests this might have been the case. 
Figure 2.1 features municipalities of the Netherlands in 1909. Each node indicates the 
percentage of people who did not belong to any church. The proportion of people with 
no denomination per municipality varied from 0 to 35 per cent. As Figure 2.1 clearly 
shows, the South of the country (traditionally Catholic lands) was characterized by the 
absence of secularization in the early 20th century. In contrast, traditionally Protestant 
territories in the North experienced a significant variation in secularization already in 
1909. Figure 2.1 provides an intuition that secularization in the Netherlands was already 
on its way in the beginning of the 20th century and evinced a different rate among 
traditionally Protestant and traditionally Catholic regions. We hypothesize variation in 
secularization trends in mostly Protestant regions in the early 20th century could be at 
least partially explained by differences in the extent of religious competition. Moreover, 
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we believe these differences could have had enduring effects even to the extent that they 
could predict variation in present-day levels of secularization. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Secularization by municipalities in 1909, the Netherlands 
Source: (1) GIS data source: Huijsmans (2013); (2) Numbers of religious people per municipality are 
derived from the CBS software StatLine. 
 
The shadow of history 
The existing literature offers some historical assessments of the effect of 
religious markets on religious vitality, yet with certain limitations. For instance, a 
number of studies have explored data on historical religious markets in Britain in 1851, 
New York in 1855 and 1865, and even Delphi from the 8th century BCE to the 4th CE 
(Iannaccone, Haight, and Rubin 2011; Finke, Guest, and Stark 1996; Voas, Olson, and 
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Crockett 2002). These studies, however, focused exclusively on the past. Other studies, 
such as Bruce’s (1995) paper on Britain or Lechner’s (1996) paper on the Netherlands, 
present data on different decades. However, they did not model changes over time. 
Statistical models where social and economic institutions in the past, including religious 
markets, are used as predictors of religious participation in the present are scarce in the 
literature. A dissertation by Olav (2010), who studied the duration of competition as a 
predictor of religious participation, is a notable exception. However, his study employs 
the World Values Survey and therefore cannot draw on the historical sources of 
secularization that predate the survey fieldwork.  
We seek to explain current levels of religious vitality in the Netherlands by 
looking at the interaction between predominant religious tradition and Church 
fragmentation that took place a hundred years back. Descriptive historical analysis 
suggests high path-dependency in both fragmentation and secularization levels.  This is 
shown in Figure 2.2, which presents graphically two correlations: (1) the correlation 
between the proportion of people with no religious affiliation in 1909 and 2008 in each 
sub-regional unit; and (2) the correlation between the HH index of religious 
concentration across the same two data points (data and measures are discussed below). 
These correlations are surprisingly strong despite one hundred years of social and 
economic change in the country: for concentration indexes the correlation is 0.84, for 
church departures is 0.56.  
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Figure 2.2. Path dependency: Correlations between 1909 and 2000s on the level of 40 NUTS-3 sub-
regions, the Netherlands 
(1) Left side – correlation between HHI in 1909 and HHI in 2000s;  
(2) Right side – correlation between having no church denomination in 1909 and having no denomination 
in 2000s. 
Sources: 1909 census data, ESS (2002-2008). 
 
3.4. Data, analytical strategy, and variables 
3.4.a.Data 
We merge historical data from 1909 with survey data for the recent decade. 
Historical data come from various sources. Church affiliations per municipality in 1909 
are derived from the StatLine software of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS). 
Historical variables of socio-economic modernization are retrieved from the Historical 
International Standardized Community Indicators. Survey data are derived from the 
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European Social Survey (2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008). These four rounds of the Dutch 
ESS were selected because of their sampling design. In the period 2002-2008 the Dutch 
sample was based on so-called COROPS that correspond to the NUTS-3 units. 
According to the ESS manual, the Dutch ESS sample is representative at the level of 
NUTS-3. All historical data originally are at the level of municipalities. For the present 
empirical study, historical data were collapsed to the level of contemporary COROPS 
(NUTS-3) units and then merged with the ESS data, as explained in detail in Appendix 
1. The final number of sub-regions used in the statistical models is 39. 
3.4.b. Analytical strategy 
In order to test the hypotheses that religious competition might have hindered 
secularization in traditionally Protestant regions (while fragmentation might have 
actually increased secularization in Catholic ones), we employ multilevel logistic 
regression. Multilevel models take into account the contextual allocation of 
observations thus reducing the risks of spurious significance results (Hox, Moerbeek 
and van de Schoot 2010). All individuals are nested within COROP-regions of the 
Netherlands (NUTS-3).  
We have discussed earlier that Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002) demonstrated 
that the use of standard HH index of concentration might lead to spurious non-zero 
correlations due to variations in denominational size. Previous studies circumvented this 
issue by looking for alternative data or models (Montgomery 2003; Olav 2010; Van 
Tubergen and Sindradottir 2011). Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002) proposed to use the 
bootstrapping method in order to test “whether it seems plausible that the real 
correlation is mostly the result of the variations in denominational size or conversely 
might reflect the influence of additional factors not included in the simulations” (ibid. 
2002, 219). We follow this method and run 1,000 simulations for each region. These 
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simulations reveal that in the case of the Netherlands, the correlations between HH 
index and religious affiliation in 1909 are not spuriously driven by variation in 
denominational size (see Appendix 2). 
3.4.c. Variables 
Dependent variable 
Secularization. We use information about religious denomination, which is 
coded as 1 when ESS respondents report no religious affiliation and 0 otherwise.   
Using religious affiliation allows for a direct link between the ESS data and our 
historical data on affiliations and hence to place religious affiliations in the Netherlands 
in a long-term perspective.  
Independent variables  
Religious concentration. We employ the Herfindahl-Hirschman index after 
applying bootstrap simulations in the similar vein to Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002). 
The index is constructed from the 1909 census data at the regional level. 
Predominantly Protestant regions in 1909. The number of all Protestants in the 
municipality is retrieved from the CBS software. These figures are collapsed to the level 
of COROP sub-regions. Whenever a sub-region displays more than 70 per cent of 
Protestants amongst all religious individuals in 1909 it is labeled as “predominantly 
Protestant” (15 regions out of 39). By construction, value 0 captures predominantly 
Catholic regions. We apply other thresholds such as 60 per cent and 80 per cent as well 
in order to test sensitivity of our findings (the number of such regions is 26 and 12 
respectively).  We will discuss this below. 
Share of Catholics in 1909. As discussed above, we theorize that intra-doctrinal 
competition hinders secularization in Protestant regions. Furthermore, we assume that 
pillarization significantly blocked Protestant-Catholic competition for congregation (i.e. 
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“religious oligopolies”). Therefore, it is crucial to control for the presence of Catholics 
in predominantly Protestant regions, since higher rates of competition there might imply 
that there were more Catholics in 1909 that were less likely to secularize. In other 
words, only by controlling for the share of Catholics in each region, then we interpret 
our results as reflecting intra-Protestant competition. 
Educational expansion and mass transport in 1909. Secularization is often 
attributed to socio-economic developments such as educational and economic growth 
(Hirschle 2013; van Ingen and Moor 2015). Thus, it is crucial to control for the 
potentially confounding effect of modernization on secularization trends. To this end, 
we employ the share of enrolled pupils with respect to the total population in a COROP 
in 1909 as well as the share of municipalities that have a train station (or tram with a 
steam engine). The final variables that are utilized in the models are dummies that 
indicate whether a particular region is in the third quartile of the respective distribution. 
We apply this threshold because both education and mass transport were quite 
developed in all regions of the Netherlands by 1909, thus we would need a special 
yardstick to select the most modernized territories. However, we applied alternative 
thresholds to construct respective dummy variables as well (i.e. average and median 
values) in order to ensure sensitivity of our analysis. 
Net migration and GDP per capita in 2000. Present-day secularization will 
logically respond also to present-day factors. In order to identify path-dependency we 
must therefore net out our estimates form the potential effect of contemporary factors 
operating at the level of sub-regions. We use information on average GDP per capita 
and net migration rates in 2000 measured the level of COROPs to control for variation 
in economic development across Dutch sub-regions. These variables are derived from 
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the webpage of the Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS). Both variables are 
centered in the models. 
Individual-level controls. We also account for individual-level sources of 
variation in religious affiliation by introducing controls for age, gender, ISEI, and 
whether a respondent was born in the Netherlands. This way we account for standard 
individual-level predictors of religiosity as pointed out in the existing literature, 
including generational replacement, gender socialization, nation-based socialization, 
and socio-economic status (Kelley and de Graaf 1997; Van Tubergen and Sindradottir, 
2011).  
Descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables are presented 
in Table 2.1. A correlation matrix with all contextual variables is presented in Table 2.2.  
 
Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics. 
 N Mean Median SD Min Max 
Being without any denomination 7,359 0.57 - - 0 1 
HH index in 1909  39 0.65 0.62 0.17 0.41 0.97 
Modernized regions (mass transport) 39 0.24 - - 0 1 
Modernized regions (educational expansion) 39 0.29 - - 0 1 
Share of Catholics in 1909 39 0.40 0.33 0.29 0.00 0.98 
GDP per capita in a region in 2000 39 25,78 23,8 5420,437 16,2 39,26 
Net migration in 2000  39 1,911 1,452 2,091.407 -1,693 8,339 
Age  7,359 48.9 48 17.48 15 95 
Male  7,359 0.44 - - 0 1 
ISEI  7,359 47 49 16.46 16 90 
Born in the country  7,359 0.92 - - 0 1 
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Table 2.2. Correlation matrix for the contextual variables. 
 
HHI in 1909 Share of 
Protestants in 
1909* 
Share of trains 
in 1909* 
Share of 
enrolled pupils 
in 1909* 
Share of 
Catholics in 
1909 
GDP per capita 
in 2000 
Migration in 
2000 
HHI in 1909 1       
Share of 
Protestants in 
1909* 
-0.72 1      
Share of trains 
in 1909* 
-0.05 -0.03 1     
Share of 
enrolled pupils 
in 1909* 
-0.24 0.27 0.17 1    
Share of 
Catholics in 
1909 
0.75 -1.00 0.05 -0.29 1   
GDP per capita 
in 2000 
-0.25 -0.09 -0.30 0.04 0.03 1  
Migration in 
2000 
-0.20 0.28 -0.30 0.31 -0.28 0.17 1 
* is not included to the models 
 
3.5. Results 
Results of the binomial multilevel regression models are presented in Table 2.3. 
This table includes three models. Model 1 includes historical variables of religious 
concentration (HH index), and whether a region was predominantly Protestant at the 
beginning of the 20th century, together with present-day individual-level controls. 
Model 2 includes additional controls for historical modernization and religious 
composition as well as more recent economic performance at the regional level. The 
same model includes the interaction term between church concentration and Protestant 
predominance in 1909 as well. Finally, Model 3 includes two more interaction terms 
between church concentration and modernization in 1909. 
The main effect of religious concentration in 1909 and present-day values of 
secularization in models 1 is negative. This suggests that when the rate of religious 
competition in history is low, the likelihood of a respondent in the ESS sample to be 
secular decreases, a finding which is in sharp contrast to the predictions of standard 
RMT. But Model 1 assumes the effect of concentration on current levels of 
secularization is constant across historically Protestant and Catholic sub-regions. 
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Models 2 to 3 suggest this is actually not the case. Consistent with our expectations, we 
find that past fragmentation increases current levels of religious affiliations in 
predominantly Protestant sub-regions, while the opposite is true in predominantly 
Catholic ones. This finding is robust to both individual-level controls as well as to 
accounting for historical and present-day differences in economic development across 
sub-regions. 
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Table 2.3. Logistic multilevel regression.  Having no church affiliation (ESS 2002-2008) regressed on the 
historical church concentration (census, 1909). The Netherlands. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed effects    
Intercept 1.249 (0.292) *** 1.145 (0.312) *** 1.216 (0.392) ** 
Religious concentration in 1909 -1.131 (0.37) ** -1.455 (0.596) * -1.645 (0.899) + 
Historically Protestant regions 0.048 (0.129) -1.338 (0.627) * -1.498 (0.717) * 
Modernization (transport in 1909)  0.216 (0.122) + 0.498 (0.479) 
Modernization (educational expansion in 1909)  0.205 (0.142) -0.198 (0.722) 
Catholics in 1909  0.376 (0.447) 0.529 (0.606) 
GDP in a region in 2000  0.084 (0.062) 0.087 (0.064) 
Net migration in 2000  0.035 (0.063) 0.031 (0.063) 
Interactions between 
Religious concentration in 1909 and: 
   
*Historically Protestant regions  2.745 (1.147) * 3.081 (1.382) * 
* Modernization (transport in 1909)   -0.444 (0.728) 
* Modernization (educational exp.  in 1909)   0.717 (1.281) 
Individual level controls    
Age -0.025 (0.002) *** -0.025 (0.002) *** -0.025 (0.002) *** 
Male 0.226 (0.05) *** 0.225 (0.05) *** 0.225 (0.05) *** 
ISEI 0.003 (0.002) * 0.003 (0.002) * 0.003 (0.002) * 
Born in the country 0.794 (0.091) *** 0.804 (0.091) *** 0.801 (0.091) *** 
Variance of intercept (random) 0.104 (0.050) * 0.070 (0.040) * 0.060 (0.040) 
AIC 9,507 9,510 9,441 
N1/N2 7,359/39 7,359/39 7,359/39 
	 *** = p < 0.001, ** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.05 , + = p < 0.10. 
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Model 3, for example, suggests that if a Dutch person lives in a historically 
Protestant sub-region with moderate levels of church concentration back in 1909 (0.6), 
his or her odds of declaring no religious affiliation in the 2000s increase by a factor of 
1.79, i.e. exp (1.22 - 0.6 * 1.65 – 1 * 1.50 + 0.6 * 1 * 3.08). If church concentration was 
0.8 in 1909, the respective odds would increase by a factor of 2.40. However, when the 
same levels of concentration were present in historically Catholic regions, the odds of 
declaring no religious affiliations are 1.26 and 0.91 respectively. Therefore, we observe 
the odds of declaring no religious affiliation increase with church concentration in 
historically Protestant regions, but, decrease with church concertation in historically 
Catholic ones. 
To facilitate the interpretation of this crucial interaction, predicted probabilities 
are presented on Figure 2.3. This figure shows that church monopolization in 
traditionally Catholic regions is associated with lower levels of contemporary 
secularization, while higher fragmentation in traditionally Protestant regions correlates 
negatively with present-day secularization. This finding is consistent with the idea that 
religious (proto)markets only existed in predominantly Protestant regions, and hence it 
is only in this regions that we find the shadow or religious competition today. 
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Figure 2.3. Predicted probabilities for having no religious affiliation in the ESS data.  
 
 Finally, we would like to discuss some robustness checks we employed in order 
to challenge our results. First, we replicated our multilevel regression models with 
another link function, i.e. we applied linear probability models. The interaction of 
interest remained significant. Second, we split our data in two parts: predominantly 
Protestant and predominantly Catholic samples. We tested the role of HH index in these 
two samples (this time avoiding multilevel design since the number of regions was 
obviously smaller in each sample). The results were in line with our previous findings: 
HH index was positive in the former case and negative in the latter (p = 0.07 and p = 
0.04 respectively).  
Considering the sensitivity of our measures, we recreated our independent 
variables applying different thresholds. Considering predominance of Protestants, we 
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used 60 per cent and 80 per cent as alternative yardsticks. Considering modernization, 
we used average and median value to split our municipalities into less and more 
modernized territories. We confirmed our results using these different thresholds with 
one exception. In the case when we defined predominantly Protestant regions with the 
60 per cent threshold, our main interaction of interest was not significant when 
educational expansion was categorized using average and median values (but it was 
significant when we categorized educational expansion using its third quartile).  
3.6. Conclusions and discussion. 
Religious market theory has met a lot of resistance in sociology. This theory has 
been put on hold waiting for new theoretical and methodological advances. Both 
adherences and critics agreed, however, that the original formulations of RMT largely 
underestimated the role of social context and history. Despite this consensus, to our best 
knowledge, very few studies attempted to address these limitations empirically. In this 
paper, we offer a synthesis of religious market, ecological, and path-dependency 
perspectives and revisit the Dutch case to investigate the association between religious 
fragmentation (concentration) and secularization in a historical perspective. 
We have argued that the distinctive religious identities and the social 
organization of Protestant and Catholic groups have had an enduring effect on present-
day levels of religious participation even in a country as secularized as the Netherlands. 
One obvious conclusion, already pointed out by Lechner (1996), is that religious 
fragmentation does not always imply competition. Only under specific historical 
circumstances fragmentation might lead to competition. We have argued that in the 
Dutch case proto markets might have emerged in predominantly Protestant regions but 
not in Catholic ones. The Protestant tradition is built on the individualization of the 
religious experience and thus implies weaker church authority. This in turn facilitates 
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the birth of the religious consumer, particularly after the split in the Protestant Church 
differentiated the supply of religious services for the Protestant congregation. In 
contrast, the hierarchical nature of the religious experience within Catholicism 
combined with (and reinforced by) pillarization hindered the formation of markets in 
Catholic regions. In such regions, more concentration meant a greater control over the 
congregation and hence lower secularization. More fragmentation in Catholic regions 
did not imply greater competition.  
This argument seems consistent with the data. Merging historical data from the 
early 20th century with recent attitudinal surveys conducted at the level of “COROPS” 
(equivalent to NUTS-3 in the Netherlands), we find indeed suggestive evidence that 
higher religious concentration in the past stimulated secularization in mostly Protestant 
territories but hindered secularization in mostly Catholic ones.  
These findings provide new empirical evidence to support existing theoretical 
claims about the role of social context and path-dependency (Ammerman, 1997; 
Lechner, 1996). They also suggest that RMT will only yield analytical pay-offs if it is 
sensitive to the social and historical context in which markets are developed. Our 
approach to RMT stresses that religious markets might only emerge under very specific 
historical circumstances. In order to understand the formation of these markets one 
needs to account for the role of religious tradition, social institutions, and their 
historically specific developments.  
We see this paper only as a first step in the direction of re-conceptualizing RMT 
by embedding it in its social and historical context. Our conclusions are based on a 
statistical association between two points in time, 1909 and the 2000s. They show a 
strong association between religious fragmentation in the past and religious affiliation in 
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the present despite almost 100 years of socio-economic development and cultural and 
political change.  
Our findings also provide some questions for future research. The present 
analysis suggests that the role of socio-economic modernization in 1909 had limited 
lasting effects on contemporary religious participation. This poses the question of 
whether the socio-economic modernization argument must be re-evaluated with respect 
to the path-dependency mechanisms. Also, the statistical association between past 
indicators and present-day attitudes poses fundamental questions of identification. 
Future research should improve on the regional controls for potential confounding 
regional-level variables measuring both contemporary and historical factors.  With the 
existing data, we cannot identify the precise mechanisms through which path-
dependency operates, although the vast literature on religious socialization suggests 
inter-generational transmission of religious beliefs must have played a major role in the 
transition of religious affiliation. 
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Appendix 1: Merging historical data with the ESS 
We merge historical data from 1909 with European Social Survey data for the 
rounds 200, 2004m 2006 and 2008, as explained above. Historical data come from the 
Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS) and the Historical International Standardized 
Community Indicators. In the beginning of the 20th century there were more than 1,000 
municipalities in the Netherlands. This number was reduced to around 400 in the 21th 
century. While many European countries increased the number of their municipalities 
during the course of time by conquering new territories, the Netherlands showed the 
opposite trend. Many Dutch municipalities disappeared over the course of time by 
means of various administrative reforms. In order to fit historical municipalities to the 
present-day NUTS units the codebook “Repertorium van Nederlandse gemeenten 1812-
2006” (Van der Meer & Boonstra, 2006) was used. This codebook lists all historical 
names of the Dutch municipalities and all historical changes of their borders. For 
instance, such changes are listed as “merging with another municipality” or “emergence 
from another municipality”. Very rarely municipalities shifted to another country 
(Belgium or Germany) and had to be excluded from the analysis. In some cases, web 
pages of the Dutch provinces and Wikipedia pages of municipalities were used in order 
to track all changes in borders of some municipalities.  
An important issue is how to treat those Dutch territories that emerged very 
recently. The twelfth Dutch province Flevoland was established in 1986. Although 
some municipalities in this province were established in the same year, there are several 
municipalities that existed in 1909 and subordinated to other provinces (for instance, 
such municipalities as Warffum or Urk). These municipalities were merged and labeled 
as Flevoland. The initial number of sub-regions in the ESS data is 40. However, since 
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the historical data on the Zuidwest-Drenthe region were limited, the latter was merged 
with Zuidoost-Drenthe, hence yielding 39 sub-regions for the final analysis.  
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Appendix 2: The correlations between HH index and religious affiliation in 1909 
The Herfindahl-Hirschman index has often been used incorrectly (Voas, Olson, 
and Crockett 2002). Although the index per se is a valid measure of concentration, the 
association between this index and religious activities is problematic. The main problem 
is that both religious competition and religious practices are calculated from the same 
total population.  
Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002) demonstrated that there is a mathematical 
association between these two measures that produces non-zero correlation. This 
spurious correlation is driven by the distribution of churches in the index of 
concentration. If large denominations are more variable in the data, religious activities 
are expected to have positive correlations with concentration. If small denominations 
are more variable, religious activities are negatively correlated with concentration. They 
propose to use the bootstrapping method in order to test: “whether it seems plausible 
that the real correlation is mostly the result of the variations in denominational size or 
conversely might reflect the influence of additional factors not included in the 
simulations” (Voas, Olson, and Crockett, 2002, 219). From this citation, it is clear that it 
is not necessarily the case that the correlation is determined by the variations in 
denominational size. Additional factors not included in the simulation may be at work.  
In the case of the New York data for 1865 provided by Voas, Olson, and 
Crockett (2002), simulated correlations matched quite closely the real empirical 
correlations in their data. This was the evidence that in their case actual correlation was 
driven by the characteristics of the denominational size distribution. If the real 
correlations in our data do not match simulations, therefore, the real empirical 
association is driven by some other factors not included in the simulation. In order to 
avoid confusion, it is worth mentioning that Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002) referred 
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to an index of religious pluralism, which is the inverse of our index of church 
concentration, hence, the sign of correlation is the opposite in their case. 
We run 1,000 simulations for the data for 1909. The original source of the data 
is the census; thus, the rows of data are municipalities, and the columns are religious 
groups including a column for non-religious people. Like the method of bootstrapping 
proposed by Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002), the selection of a certain religious group 
is independent of for any other denomination. Each round a new distribution is drawn 
from each column. Each Herfindahl-Hirschman index is calculated as well as the 
proportion of religious people. Then, a correlation between these two indexes is 
calculated in each round. The final number is the average over 1,000 of correlations. 
Our bootstrapping is at the regional level. In other words, we simulate denominations 
and run correlations in each sub-region.  
Figure 2.4 reveals a great discrepancy between empirical and simulated 
correlations in 1909 at the regional level. Circles represent real correlations and 
triangles represent simulated correlations. As it can be seen, there is very little 
convergence between the real and simulated values. Therefore, in line with the 
argumentation of Voas, Olson, and Crockett (2002), the real empirical association is not 
driven by the variations in denominational size but is affected by some other factors not 
included in the simulation. The goal of the empirical part of the present article is to 
investigate whether these unobserved factors are linked with the predominant religious 
groups in a region. 
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Figure 2.4. Real and simulated correlations between Herfindahl-Hirschman index and church affiliation in 
the Netherlands, 1909 on the level of COROP regions.  
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4. Chapter 3. Church competition hypothesis revisited: new evidence from Ukraine, 
1992-2012 
 
Abstract: Although religious revivals in post-Communist Europe have been studied 
extensively, there are still many gaps in knowledge. Prior studies have doubted the role played 
by religious markets and church competition. Nevertheless, more recent literature has argued 
that religious markets are very complex and that they have multiple dimensions, some of which 
have never been brought to light. A central argument of this chapter is that a specific dimension 
of church competition in Ukraine, i.e. nationalistic competition within the Orthodox Church has 
positively affected people’s religious affiliations, attitudes and behavior. This argument is 
corroborated with a set of hierarchical and OLS models applied to novel regional data on church 
communities in Ukraine which is merged with survey data from 1992 to 2012.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 Religious revivals in post-Communist Europe have been a subject of ceaseless 
debates in sociology (Pickel and Sammet 2012). Particularly, many scholars have 
criticized the church competition hypothesis derived from religious market theory 
(Bruce 2000; Müller 2011). However, this criticism has been challenged by some case 
studies (Froese 2001; Pfaff 2012). Moreover, in Ukraine, a country under the scope of 
my analysis, church competition has been reported as an essential part of religious life 
(Krindatch 2003; Mitrokhin 2001; Yelensky 2010). Yet the link between church 
competition and religious vitality in this country has not been properly addressed. 
 This paper contributes to the literature on both church competition and post-
Communist religious revivals in two ways. First, prior studies of church competition 
primarily have addressed cross-doctrinal competition. In contrast, this paper presents an 
empirical case of intra-doctrinal competition (IDC). In Ukraine, the Orthodox Church is 
divided in several competing jurisdictions. Although these jurisdictions challenge each 
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other’s canonical legitimacy, their main disagreement has gone beyond dogmatic 
disputes and focuses on the status of nation, language, and history. This dimension of 
church competition has been omitted in the existing literature and, as we will argue, is 
crucial to understand both religious market and religious behavior in Ukraine. 
Potentially, this framework could be applied to other countries as well since religious 
denominations display fragmentation along political lines in many societies, especially 
those where the Orthodox Church is predominant (Pickel and Sammet 2012). Second, 
although most of the existing scholarship tends to criticize church competition 
hypothesis for post-Communist societies, this criticism is often based on inconclusive 
empirical analyses. This paper improves on this literature by merging a new dataset of 
religious communities in Ukraine at the regional level with attitudinal survey data from 
1992 to 2012.   
 This paper is organized as follows. First, we review the literature on church 
competition in post-Communist societies. Then the history of religious revivals in 
Ukraine is briefly discussed. After presenting the role of IDC of the Orthodox 
jurisdictions in Ukraine, we follow with the hypotheses, analytical strategy, data, 
results, and discussion.  
4.2. Church competition in post-Communist societies: review of findings 
 According to religious market theory, religious organizations constitute a market 
of religious products and services; and competition serves as a powerful source of 
religious vitality (Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000; Montgomery 2003; 
McBride 2008). Competition is important firstly because it provides additional 
incentives for churches to fight for their congregation instead of acting as “lazy firms”, 
and secondary because churches match potential religious preferences of people, thus 
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creating adequate niches. Consequently, individual religious identities and practices are 
inspired as well as reinforced by churches.  
 This theory, however, has been widely challenged. Comparative studies have 
shown that church competition does not have uniform effects on religious participation 
and depends on many other factors (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Lechner 2007; Voas, 
Crockett and Olson 2002). Nevertheless, this theory has not been rejected completely 
(Gruber and Hungerman 2006; Lechner 2007; Montgomery 2003; McBride 2008; 
Ruiter and Van Tubergen 2009). Scholars tend to agree that religious markets are very 
complex and that they have multiple dimensions, some of which have never been 
brought to light (Lechner 2007; McBride 2008). 
 Although religious revivals in post-Communist societies per se have gathered a 
lot of attention in the literature (Gautier 1997; Meulemann 2004; Pickel and Sammet 
2012; Pollack 2001), studies of church competition in these countries have been 
surprisingly scarce. Those rare studies that investigated religious markets in post-
Communist world were often inspired by different theoretical guidelines and goals.   
 The bulk of these studies cover predominantly Catholic and Protestant countries 
as Poland, Hungary, Eastern Germany, Check Republic, Slovakia, and the Baltic states 
(Bruce 2000; Froese 2001, 2005; Froese and Pfaff 2001). They mostly employed 
detailed case analyses. Cross-national studies of larger samples of countries are 
exceptional (e.g. Froese 2004; Müller 2011). Overall, these studies suggest that church 
competition does not predict religious participation, thus showing little support for 
religious market theory. As a result, some of the authors have proposed to dismiss this 
theory (Bruce 2000), whereas others have proposed to revisit it significantly with 
respect to the local context (Froese and Pfaff 2001).  
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 However, these findings could be revisited in light of more recent literature (e.g. 
Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002; McBride 2008; Lechner 2007). Although both Bruce 
(2000) and Müller (2011) do not find a positive correlation between church competition 
and religious vitality, most of their theorizing and analyses were at the national level. At 
the same time, more recent literature has pointed out that once the analysis is performed 
at the regional level, the results could be very different (McBride 2008). This is 
explained by the fact that most confounding effects operate at the regional level. 
Moreover, measurement procedures employed by both Bruce (2000) and Müller (2001) 
have been challenged if not dismissed in the literature (Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002). 
Finally, most of the abovementioned papers did not address predominantly Orthodox 
societies, although the existing literature on post-Communist religious revivals has 
consistently emphasized the importance of this context (Tomka 2006; Karpov 2013; 
Northmore-Ball and Evans 2016).  
 Another line of research has analyzed church competition in post-Communist 
societies as part of a larger research agenda (Barro, Hwang and McCleary 2010; 
McCleary and Barro 2006). These studies extended their attention to church 
competition and state regulation of religious organizations in the world. Post-
Communist societies were included in large samples of countries. Although these 
comparative studies supported religious market theory in the world, they paid little 
attention to the specific issue of post-Communist church competition.  
 Finally, a handful of recent studies have focused on post-Communist societies 
exclusively in cross-national as well as long-term perspectives (Müller and Neundorf 
2012; Northmore-Ball and Evans 2016). Although they do not focus on the religious 
market theory per se, they do include some hypotheses derived from this framework in 
order to test them against other competing explanations. These latter studies do not test 
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the role of church competition; instead they test the role of state regulations and 
favoritism. They conclude that such supply-side factors do not explain religious 
resurrections in post-Communist societies. However, this literature does not address 
church competition.  
 Considering the existing literature on Ukraine, to the best of my knowledge, 
there has been no empirical test of church competition hypothesis for this country. 
While some scholars study religious conflicts and confrontations in Ukraine (Krindatch 
2003; Mitrokhin 2001), others study religious behavior and attitudes of Ukrainians 
(Yelensky 2010). However, there are no studies that connect the two. At best, there are 
only few studies that refer to religious market theory as a taken-for-granted concept that 
is potentially responsible for some part of religious change in Ukraine (Balakireva and 
Sereda 2013; Parashevin 2006).  
 All said, it seems that the reservations about the church competition argument in 
post-Communist societies are not well grounded. Most of the empirical studies excluded 
predominantly Orthodox countries; some comparative studies of church competition 
employed questionable quantitative analyses; and in some cases, negative findings 
about religious regulations yielded skepticism towards religious market theory as a 
whole. 
4.3. A brief history of religious revivals in Ukraine 
 In general, religious institutions witnessed a variety of penalties under 
Communist regimes. The strength of prosecutions varied across countries as well as 
over time. At best, religion was stigmatized as a primitive and superstitious rudiment 
(Gautier 1998). However, in most cases religion was forcibly excluded from public life: 
churches were expropriated or destroyed; priests were repressed; religious education 
was banned; and everywhere the symbolic role of religion was diminished (Greeley 
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1994; Pollack 2001; Voicu and Tufiş 2013; Zrinščak 2004). However, by the late 1980s 
the gradual disappearance of the strong state control led to religious freedoms in almost 
all European Communist societies (Meulemann 2004; Pollack 2001).  
 Considering Ukraine, truly active religious revivals started there in the late 
1980s. Soviet authorities encouraged religious practices in line with perestroika and 
glasnost.  Religious rituals were broadcast on TV, the state officially celebrated the 
Millennium of the Christianization of Kievan Rus’ in 1988, and General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev met with Pope John Paul II in 1989 (Krindatch 2003; Panych 2014; 
Yelensky 2010). Such top-down legitimization of religious practices yielded a 
significant increase in religious participation. By the end of 1990 more than three 
quarters of adult Ukrainians were religious (Yelensky 2010). Furthermore, this top-
down legitimation was supported and reinforced by local religious actors (priests and 
communities) making Ukraine quite different in this respect from Russia where, in 
contrast, desecularization from above was the main source of religious resurrections 
(Karpov 2013). 
 Although the majority of Ukrainians identify themselves as Orthodox, religious 
market in Ukraine has become quite pluralistic mostly due to intra-doctrinal competition 
of the Orthodox Church (Borowik 2002; Krindatch 2003; Karpov 2013). According to 
the survey conducted in 2015 (DIF 2015), 44 per cent of religious people identified 
themselves with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan patriarchate (UOC-KP), 
and 21 per cent identified themselves with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the 
Moscow patriarchate (UOC-MP). Other important Ukrainian churches were the Greek 
Catholic Church (11%), the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) 
(2.4%), different Protestant churches (2.5%), and the Roman Catholic Church (1%). 
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There are also traditional regional minorities that adhere to Islam (mostly Crimean 
Tatars) and Judaism.  
4.4. The role of intra-doctrinal competition (IDC) in Ukraine 
 In order to understand Ukrainian intra-doctrinal competition (IDC) one has to 
keep in mind that religious and national identities have been strongly connected in post-
Communist societies (Pickel and Sammet 2012). Many scholars of Central and Eastern 
Europe, and Ukraine in particular, have regarded national sentiments as the strongest 
source of solidarity and religious consciousness in post-Communist countries (Borowik 
2002; Spohn 2012; Yelensky 2010). Historically, organized religious movements often 
resisted to the Soviet repressions and championed new independent national states 
(Spohn 2012). Furthermore, churches played a crucial role in the aftermath of the fall of 
communist states during difficult political, economic, and social crises (Balakireva and 
Sereda 2013; Pickel and Sammet 2012; Tomka 1991). In post-Communist societies 
churches emphasized history, tradition, and culture as a powerful source of reassurance 
and solidarity (Spohn 2012; Tomka 1991; Zrinščak 20014). They often presented 
difficult transformations as a stage for the nation to achieve its long-deserved prosperity 
and glory. Since narratives about an idealized past, a depressive present and a utopian 
future of nations constitute a method for mobilizing mass political movements 
(Levinger and Lytle 2001), organized religious groups in post-Communist countries 
naturally have become significant political actors. 
 Ukraine was not an exception from this general story. Religious identities there 
were strongly connected to national sentiments (Yelensky 2010). Those traditional 
churches that re-emerged after the collapse of the USSR frequently appealed to shared 
beliefs about an idealized national past and an equally idealized future (Krindatch 2003; 
Mitrokhin 2001; Yelensky 2010). Most importantly, however, different religious groups 
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within the Orthodox tradition appealed to different historical and national narratives in 
Ukraine (Krindatch 2003). Conflicting nationalistic narratives caused a separation of the 
Orthodox Church. As Krindatch put it: “The separation of Ukrainian Orthodoxy from 
Moscow is obviously considered by politicians and the state authorities in Kiev as a 
necessary complement to Ukrainian national independence” (Krindatch 2003: 69). This 
separation yielded “competitive coexistence of several Orthodox jurisdictions” 
(Krindatch 2003: 59).  
 These jurisdictions were: the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
patriarchate (UOC-MP), the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyivan patriarchate 
(UOC-KP), and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC). It is 
noteworthy that only the first church has been officially recognized in the international 
realm of Orthodoxy. Other churches are not recognized internationally and they declare 
their legitimacy unilaterally. This fact, however, has not prevented the UOC-KP from 
being the most popular Ukrainian church according to the existing surveys (DIF 2015).  
 These different Orthodox jurisdictions have exploited different national 
narratives in order to maintain and expand their congregations. For example, the UOC-
MP has appealed to the pre-Soviet historical narratives of the Russian Empire as well as 
more recent supra national narratives of the “Russian World doctrine” which is based on 
three pillars: the Orthodox belief, Russian language, and historical Russian tradition 
(Balakireva and Sereda 2013). These narratives attracted individuals who were loyal to 
pro-Russian sentiments. On the other hand, the same narratives discouraged individuals 
who did not share such sentiments.  
 Most recently a new trend of hostility towards the Moscow patriarchate has 
emerged as a consequence of the Crimean annexation by Russia and the ensuing hybrid 
war. Surveys conducted in Ukraine in 2015 documented that 19 per cent of respondents 
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agreed that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate is the “church 
of the state aggressor that carries out harmful activities” (DIF 2015). Moreover, a small 
number of Orthodox communities changed their affiliation from the Moscow 
patriarchate to the Kyivan patriarchate (RISU 2015).  
 In contrast, the UOC-KP and the UAOC exploited pro-Ukrainian historical 
narratives claiming that Ukraine is the historical cradle of Russian Orthodoxy. 
Furthermore, these churches championed the usage of Ukrainian language during 
religious services. Their own disagreements were based on sometimes different ideas of 
their historical legitimacy and recriminations about connections with Soviet authorities 
(Mitrokhin 2001).  
4.5. Hypotheses: IDC and national identities 
 As it was stated above, church competition between different jurisdictions of the 
Orthodox Church in Ukraine has been connected to national sentiments. All Orthodox 
churches have appealed to the values of tradition, origin, and nation in their attempt to 
summon congregations (Krindtach 2003). For example, the 1990s and early 2000s were 
marked by active confrontations between different Orthodox religious groups for 
buildings and land, for symbolic recognition in the state and internationally, and for the 
attention of economic and political elites (Krindatch 2003; Mitrokhin 2001). Therefore, 
churches were incentivized to mobilize people to support their cause and to defend their 
jurisdiction. That is why higher rates of IDC between Orthodox jurisdictions at the 
regional level must have positively affected religious participation.  
 (H1) People who live in a territory exposed to higher rates of IDC will be more 
religious. 
 Although the existing literature on church competition is often focused on 
suppliers and their incentives, more recent literature has shown that consumers’ 
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preferences should be taken into account as well (Barro, Hwang and McClearly 2010; 
Montgomery 2003). As this literature shows individuals might change their religious 
preferences depending on their social position, age, gender or any other meaningful 
social category depending on the context. Since this paper is focused on a very specific 
dimension of church competition, i.e. nationalistic competition, it is important to 
account for the respective preferences of consumers. In Ukraine, different Orthodox 
jurisdictions have targeted individuals on the basis of their national identities. While 
some churches appealed to the supra-national identity of the “Russian world”, others 
appealed to patriotism and nationalism of Ukrainians. Therefore, individuals were likely 
to vary in their response to IDC depending on their own nationalistic preferences.  
 Since the very process of IDC in Ukraine emerged after some Orthodox 
churches developed strong pro-Ukrainian narratives, installed Ukrainian language 
during religious ceremonies, and offered an idea of an independent Ukrainian church in 
the independent Ukrainian state, it is likely that people who displayed pro-Ukrainian 
preferences were more likely to respond positively to IDC.  
 
 (H2) The impact of IDC will be stronger for people with stronger pro-Ukrainian 
national preferences. 
 
 Finally, it is important to study the impact of IDC with respect to indicators of 
religiosity. “Believing without belonging” (Davie 1990) is a common trend which is 
observed in many societies including the post-Communist ones (Pollack 2003), and 
effectively is about discrepancy between different indicators of religiosity (Davie 2005). 
In post-Communist societies, individuals often declare eagerly their religious affiliation, 
yet their actual religious participation could be minimal (Karpov 2013; Pew Research 
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Center 2017). Religious affiliations often serve for group identification in post-
Communist societies (Spohn 2012). However, the cost of actual involvement is much 
higher than the cost of being affiliated. Moreover, in Ukraine, as will be discussed 
below in greater detail, one can see a striking mismatch between the numbers of people 
who declare their religiosity and the numbers of religious communities. For example, 
more people identify with the UOC-KP than with UOC-MP. However, the UOC-KP has 
fewer religious communities than UOC-MP. Furthermore, many have argued that 
church attendance is in general lower among Orthodox (Tomka 2006). Even the most 
faithful and devoted Orthodox attends churches less often compared to Catholics. 
Furthermore, years of Communist repressions deteriorated the intellectual tradition of 
Orthodoxy resulting in widespread mysticism and religious heterodoxies (Borowik 
2002). Therefore, one can expect that church attendance, personal religiosity and 
praying are less likely to be affected by IDC and nationalistic competition.  
4.6. Data and methods 
4.6.a. New data on religious communities. 
 Measures of church competition derived from surveys or censuses have been 
questioned in the literature because of the high risk of spurious correlations with 
measures of religious participation. As a solution, it is vital to find measures that are 
“relative to some base other than the total population” (Voas, Crockett and Olson, 2002: 
215). In order to address this issue a new dataset on religious communities is employed 
here to construct Herfindahl-Hirschman index of church competition. 
 According to Ukrainian legislation, a religious community is a local religious 
organization of faithful people who practice the same religion. Religious communities 
are not obliged to register since the state has no legal rights to dictate religious practices. 
Therefore, local state offices obtain information about religious communities only after 
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the latter apply for registration. Nevertheless, religious communities have a strong 
incentive to apply because without such registration, it is quite difficult to practice 
religion, expand, and compete with other religious groups. For example, registration is 
vital in case of litigation.  
 Conceptually, the data on religious communities have several advantages. First 
of all, religious communities are less distant to individuals than abstract religious 
organizations. A certain religious organization may not have a church or a priest in a 
given village or neighborhood; however, the actual members of a religious community 
would still represent this organization. These members may spread their religion and 
provide social services through social networks. The presence of more than one 
community increases the probability that a nonreligious person encounters and interacts 
with religious people. Thus, the presence of religious communities contributes to peer-
pressure and the spread of religious norms and ideologies. Finally, the study of religious 
communities is theoretically consistent with the theory of club goods which has 
received a particular attention in the existing literature on religious supply (Abramitzky 
2008; Iannaccone 1992). This theory emphasizes the role which religious communities 
play in ensuring religious participation.   
 A problem of these data is, however, that there is no information about the size 
of religious communities. A community has to include a minimum of 10 people. 
However, there is no information about the upper bound. This limitation does not allow 
the building of hypotheses concerning the size of the community. Nevertheless, it is still 
possible to work within a framework of church competition since this framework is 
concerned with the shares of religious groups, not their actual sizes. Most importantly, 
these data on church communities circumvent the issue of confounding the demand and 
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supply sides, as has frequently happened with survey data (Voas, Crockett and Olson 
2002). 
 Similar data on church communities in Ukraine have been employed in the 
existing literature (Balakirieva and Sereda 2013; Yelensky 2010; Krindatch 2003). 
However, the present data include hitherto the longest series with regional variation.  
Figure 3.1 reveals the data at the national level. Note that these figures are estimates 
(see Appendix for the details).  
 As it can be seen from Figure 3.1, the UOC-MP dominated in terms of religious 
communities from 1991 to 2015, growing from an estimated number of 5,031 to 12,574. 
The second largest group was all Protestant communities combined (from 1,823 to 
10,038 respectively). However, surveys report that actually only between 1% and 2.5% 
of people belong to Protestant churches at present day in present day Ukraine (DIF, 
2015). Nevertheless, Protestant churches managed to produce the most active 
communities (most likely of very small sizes). As it can be seen, the UOC-KP grew in 
the early 1990s at the expense of the UOAC. The UOC-KP demonstrated a stable 
growth in the course of time, outrunning the Greek Catholic communities (the latter did 
not manage to expand outside of Western Ukraine). As it was discussed above in the 
text, most of respondents tend to identify with the UOC-KP. However, Figure 3.1 shows 
that the UOC-KP is only the third in numbers of religious communities.  
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Figure 3.1. Religious communities (estimated absolute numbers). Ukraine, 1991-2013.  
  
 Two independent datasets were merged with the abovementioned data on 
religious communities. The first one is a dataset pooled from the surveys conducted by 
the Institute of Sociology of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine (ISNASU) 
from 1992 to 2006. The second one is the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 
Ukraine from 2002 to 2012 every two years. These surveys employ different 
questionnaires and sample designs, which reassures the robustness of findings.  
4.6.b. Index of Orthodox intra-doctrinal competition (IDC). 
 The IDC index is calculated as the widely-recognized Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (reversed) (Chaves and Gorski 2001; Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002), with some 
adjustments. As discussed above, the index is constructed from the data about religious 
communities, which circumvents the validity issues frequently observed in the previous 
studies (Voas, Crockett and Olson 2002). However, given the theoretical focus of this 
paper, the final index is tuned to measure the impact of within-Orthodox competition. 
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 The measure offered here is the difference between the actual rates of church 
competition observed in a given region per year (HHI real) and the counterfactual rates 
of church competition, which would have been observed if the Orthodox churches were 
united (HHI counterfactual).  
 
HHIidc = HHIreal – HHIcounterfactual 
 
 HHIidc, thus, shows to what extent overall church completion is driven by 
within-Orthodox competition. HHIidc at the regional level is plotted on Figure 3.2 for 
some benchmark years. Since it is reversed, zero means absolute concentration, and one 
means absolute competition. As can be seen, this index grew over time. In some 
regions, nationalistic church competition accounted for 20% of total church 
competition.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. IDC of the Orthodox Church at the regional level. Ukraine, 1991-2009. 
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4.6.c. Modeling 
 Two different sets of models are fitted. First, a binary variable of religious 
affiliation is studied in the case of the ISNASU dataset. Due to the large sample, a 
significance test may produce an inflated type I error rate (Hox, Moerbeek and van de 
Schoot 2010). Thus, mixed-effect logistic models are applied. All individuals are nested 
in groups of regions per year (26 regions and 14 years). Furthermore, mixed models 
account for the fact that most Ukrainian regions witnessed significant changes from the 
early 1990s to the 2000s with respect to almost all underlying social and demographic 
processes including death rates, aging, de-industrialization, and migration (World Bank 
2015). Thus, each region in a given year provides a set of unique social circumstances, 
which fits the underlying logic of multilevel contextual analysis. Moreover, a religious 
community is obliged to be registered in a particular region. Therefore, religious 
competition is happening on the level of regions, since religious groups do not have 
incentives to spend their resources on competition for congregation from other regions.  
 Then, a series of OLS regressions is fitted for the European Social Survey data. 
Subjective religiosity, church attendance, and praying at home are modeled in this case.  
4.6.d. Variables 
Dependent variable  
 Religious participation is measured with four different variables. The ISNASU 
surveys provide information about church affiliation. A dummy variable of church 
affiliation is employed in this case. Considering the ESS data, this survey provides 
information about subjective religiosity, church attendance, and praying at home.  
Independent variables 
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 National identities. National identities are difficult to conceptualize and 
measure. In Ukraine, however, there is a long tradition to measure language preferences 
as a proxy for national identities (for more information see Kulyk 2006, 2011). 
Although most of Ukrainians demonstrate considerable knowledge of both Ukrainian 
and Russian, one can see a variation of preferences in daily usage. Moreover, language 
is a “…powerful predictor of people’s attitudes and policy preferences with regard to 
both language use and other socially divisive issues, such as foreign policy and 
historical memory” (Kulyk 2011, 627). Furthermore, long history of Soviet language 
polices made Ukrainian language less prestigious and useful (Martin 2001). Therefore, 
the cost for using Ukrainian language is higher than the respective cost for Russian 
language and, thus, could be used a proxy for commitment to a national identity. 
Finally, empirical studies showed that people with stronger Ukrainian identities tend to 
support pro-Ukrainian language polices. However, the desire of people with stronger 
Russian identities to defend pro-Russian language polices depends on the region (Kulyk 
2011). Therefore, one can assume that those Ukrainians who prefer using Ukrainian 
language are likely to respond positively to IDC. On the other hand, a reaction of those 
Ukrainians who speak Russian language could depend on other factors. A dummy 
variable for the preference for Ukrainian language is utilized in the analysis.  
 In the case of the ESS dataset, voting for parties with pro-Russian sentiments in 
the Parliament elections are included as well (i.e. voting for Communist Party of 
Ukraine, and the Party of Regions). 
 Economic developments and existential security. The existing literature 
emphasizes the pivotal role of national identities as well as transitions from planned to 
market economy played in religious revivals in post-Communist societies (for the recent 
review see Pickel and Sammet 2012). Some of these explanations echo widely-
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acknowledged insecurity theory (Norris and Inglehart 2011). Recent literature has 
demonstrated that both economic and social insecurities at both the individual and 
contextual levels are important for religious participation (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 
2013). Thus, a number of variables that account for social and economic insecurities at 
both of these levels are included in the models (employment status, educational status, 
health status, loss of a partner, economic performance of a region, and the level of 
unemployment in a region). All these variables were derived from the surveys. 
Unfortunately, most of the statistical data on the economic performance of regions are 
hardly available for the early 1990s. However, there are some exceptions. GDP per 
capita as well as average incomes in Ukrainian regions were derived from the national 
statistics. 
 A set of controls such as gender, age, and time after the collapse of the USSR 
are employed in the models as well.  All the variables and their descriptive statistics are 
listed in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for all variables 
Variable Data Source Level Mean Median SD Min Max 
Church affiliation ISNASUU Individual 0.73 - - 0.00 1.00 
Subjective religiosity ESS Individual 6.15 6.00 2.67 1.00 11.00 
Church attendance ESS Individual 1.98 2.00 1.35 0.00 6.00 
Praying at home ESS Individual 3.16 3.00 2.37 0.00 6.00 
IDC in 1991 Communities Contextual 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.16 
Is employed ISNASUU Individual 0.51 - - 0.00 1.00 
Employment status Unlimited contract ESS Individual 0.78 - - 0.00 1.00 
Prefer Ukrainian language ISNASUU Individual 0.37 - - 0.00 1.00 
Prefer Ukrainian language ESS Individual 0.22 - - 0.00 1.00 
Health is bad ISNASUU Individual 0.28 - - 0.00 1.00 
Health is bad ESS Individual 2.94 3.00 0.86 1.00 5.00 
Loss of a partner ISNASUU Individual 0.11 - - 0.00 1.00 
Loss of a partner ESS Individual 0.25 - - 0.00 1.00 
Has a higher degree ISNASUU Individual 0.10 - - 0.00 1.00 
Has a higher degree ESS Individual 0.25 - - 0.00 1.00 
Voted for pro-Russian parties ESS Individual 0.24 - - 0.00 1.00 
Share of unemployed respondents ISNASUU Contextual 0.49 0.46 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Share of unemployed respondents ESS Contextual 0.22 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.34 
Share of mostly Ukrainian speakers ISNASUU Contextual 0.37 0.23 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Share of mostly Ukrainian speakers ESS Contextual 0.22 0.18 0.15 0.00 0.61 
Share of respondents with higher degree ISNASUU Contextual 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.00 1.00 
GPD per capita in a region National statistics  Contextual 1558.00 1488.00 740.02 707.10 2722.00 
Average salary in a region National statistics  Contextual 1364.00 1271.00 1.38 454.40 2465.00 
Men ISNASUU Individual 0.44 - - 0.00 1.00 
Men ESS Individual 0.37 - - 0.00 1.00 
Age younger 30 ISNASUU Individual 0.23 - - 0.00 1.00 
Age 30-55 ISNASUU Individual 0.49 - - 0.00 1.00 
Age 55 and older ISNASUU Individual 0.29 - - 0.00 1.00 
Age  ESS Individual 49.25 50.00 18.80 15.00 102.00 
Years after the collapse of the USSR ISNASUU Individual 8.44 9.00 4.14 1.00 15.00 
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4.7. Results 
 The results of hierarchical regression models applied to the ISNASU data are 
described in Table 3.2. This table shows four models with the effects of IDC in 1991 on 
the religious affiliation of individuals nested in 355 social contexts (i.e. regions per 
year) in Ukraine from 1992 to 2006. The first model evaluates the role of IDC 
independently. Then, other individual and contextual predictors are included in Model 
2. Then, a set of interactions between IDC and individual-level predictors are 
incorporated in Model 3. Finally, the latter model is repeated without regions-outliers. 
There are three regions-outliers (all in Western Ukraine) with relatively large rates of 
religious people and individuals with stronger Ukrainian identities. These regions were 
excluded in Model 4.  
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Table 3.2. The impact of IDC on religious affiliations (ISNASU surveys, 1992-2006). Mixed 
effects logistic regression models. 
 Model 1  
(all regions) 
Model 2 
(all regions) 
Model 3 
(all regions) 
Model 4 
(no outliers) 
Intercept 1.175 (0.078) *** -0.659 (0.192) ** -0.592 (0.191) ** -0.539 (0.195) + 
IDC in 1991 10.820 (1.784) *** 9.560 (1.356) *** 6.217 (1.719) *** 4.659 (1.966) * 
Individual     
Has a job  -0.230 (0.040) *** -0.207 (0.048) *** -0.212 (0.049) *** 
Has a higher education  -0.243 (0.053) *** -0.291 (0.070) *** -0.280 (0.070) *** 
Bad health  0.133 (0.040) *** 0.146 (0.049) * 0.145 (0.050) * 
Loss of a partner  0.320 (0.064) *** 0.335 (0.080) *** 0.336 (0.079) *** 
Ukrainian language   0.548 (0.045) *** 0.388 (0.053) *** 0.407 (0.054) *** 
Contextual     
Share of unemployed in a context  0.331 (0.271) 0.344 (0.265) 0.360 (0.269) 
Share of Ukrainian speakers in a context  1.672 (0.147) *** 1.606 (0.145) *** 1.406 (0.157) *** 
Share of tertiary educated in a context  -0.693 (0.759) -0.124 (0.753) -0.372 (0.787) 
Controls     
Time after the collapse of the USSR  0.127 (0.012) *** 0.123 (0.012) *** 0.126 (0.012) *** 
Age (reference - younger than 30)     
Age 30-55  -0.015 (0.040) -0.017 (0.040) -0.009 (0.041) 
Age 55 and older  0.137 (0.052) + 0.136 (0.053) + 0.144 (0.053) + 
Male  -0.829 (0.033) *** -0.830 (0.033) *** -0.837 (0.036) *** 
Interactions between IDC in 1991 and:     
IDC*has a job   -1.076 (1.188) -0.601 (1.259) 
IDC *higher education   1.746 (1.480) 2.596 (1.519) 
IDC *bad health   -0.446 (1.312) -0.648 (1.373) 
IDC *loss   -0.551 (2.178) -0.621 (2.242) 
IDC *Ukrainian language   8.215 (1.463) *** 3.112 (1.586) * 
N 25,177 25,177 25,177 22,665 
Groups 355 355 355 314 
Average observations per groups 71 71 71 72 
Intraclass correlation 26% 11% 11% 10% 
AIC 26,416 24,766 24,743 23,896 
Significance codes: ‘***’ – < 0.001; ‘**’ – < 0.01; “*” – < 0.05; “+” – < 0.10 
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 All the models consistently show the positive and significant influence of IDC 
on religious affiliations of Ukrainians, which is in line with the first hypothesis of this 
paper. This effect remains significant after controlling for various individual and 
contextual level predictors.  Congruently with the previous literature, individual social 
and economic insecurities increase religiosity (Immerzeel and van Tubergen 2013). 
Ukrainian identity is positively associated with religiosity, which is in line with the 
existing literature as well (Yelensky 2010).  
 Furthermore, both Model 3 (all sample) and Model 4 (no regions-outliers) show 
the results that are in line with the second hypothesis of this paper. Indeed, the impact of 
IDC is stronger for people who display pro-Ukrainian identities. Figure 3.3 shows the 
predicted probabilities of church affiliation plotted against the rates of IDC in 1991. It 
features Model 3 with the interaction effect between IDC in 1991 and language 
preferences of respondents. Although all individuals tend to be more religious when 
they are exposed to higher rates of IDC, this effect is stronger for individuals who prefer 
Ukrainian language. As confidence intervals indicate, the effect is significantly stronger 
at the highest levels of IDC. 
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Figure 3.3. Interaction effects: IDC in 1991 and language preferences in 1992-2006 (ISNASU surveys). 
Predicted probabilities. Mixed effects logistic regression controlling for individual and contextual level 
predictors (Model 3). 
 
 To what extent do these results hold true for subjective religiosity, church 
attendance and prayer at home? To answer this question the data from the European 
Social Survey (2002 – 2012) are utilized (Table 3.3). OLS regressions reveal that the 
effect of IDC remains the same as in previous models (i.e. significant and positive).  
 However, in these models the effect of pro-Ukrainian identities is different. It 
appears that the main effects for neither language preference nor electoral behavior are 
consistently significant for different measures of religious participation. On the other 
hand, the share of Ukrainian speakers at the regional level is positively associated with 
all measures of religious participation. Most importantly, we do not observe significant 
interaction effects between IDC and both language preferences and voting.  
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Table 3.3. The impact of IDC in 1991 on religious participation in Ukraine (ESS, 2002-2012). 
OLS Regressions.  
 Model 5 
Subjective Religiosity 
Model 6 
Church Attendance 
Model 7 
Praying at Home 
Intercept 5.793 (0.218) *** 1.814 (0.110) *** 2.282 (0.187) *** 
IDC in 1991 8.655 (1.204) *** 6.054 (0.604) *** 8.528 (1.018) *** 
Individual level predictors    
Is employed -0.097 (0.066) 0.028 (0.033) -0.014 (0.052) 
Speaking mostly Ukrainian 0.002 (0.095) 0.084 (0.047) + 0.216 (0.081) ** 
Widowed 0.230 (0.076) 0.113 (0.038) ** 0.250 (0.064) *** 
Bad Health 0.032 (0.036) -0.082 (0.179) *** 0.086 (0.030) *** 
Voted for the pro-Russian parties -0.218 (0.081) ** -0.031 (0.041)  -0.013 (0.070) 
Tertiary education -0.155 (0.060) ** -0.091 (0.030) ** -0.118 (0.052) * 
Interactions between IDC in 1991 and:    
IDC*Speaking mostly Ukrainian 0.721 (1.680) -0.451 (0.844) 0.256 (1.423) 
IDC*Voted for the pro-Russian parties 1.178 (2.251) -1.335 (1.333) -3.097 (1.915) 
Contextual level predictors    
Share of Ukrainian speakers in a context 3.844 (0.212) *** 2.321 (0.106) *** 5.073 (0.181) *** 
Share of tertiary educated in a context -0.702 (0.532) -0.390 (0.267) -0.107 (0.452) 
Share of unemployed in a context -2.209 (0.643) *** -0.732 (0.323) * -3.216 (0.548) *** 
GDP per capita -0.001 (0.0003) ** -0.0003 (0.0002) + -0.0003 (0.0003) 
Average salary 0.001 (0.0003) ** 0.0004 (0.0002) * 0.0001 (0.0003) 
Controls    
Male -1.239 (0.054) *** -0.615 (0.027) *** -1.345 (0.046) *** 
Age 0.012 (0.002) *** 0.003 (0.001) *** 0.014 (0.002) *** 
N 9,733 9.712 9,220 
Adjusted R-squared 0.133 0.151 0.237 
Significance codes: ‘***’ – < 0.001; ‘**’ – < 0.01; “*” – < 0.05; “+” – < 0.10. 
 
 Therefore, drawing from these two sets of models for the ISNASU and ESS data 
respectively, it is possible to conclude firstly that IDC in Ukraine has contributed 
significantly to religious participation of individuals in terms of religious affiliations, 
church attendance, praying at home, and subjective religiosity; secondly, however, as it 
is only religious affiliations that were significantly exacerbated by national identities of 
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individuals. This suggests that the connection between national identity and religious 
affiliation is stronger than that the connection between national identity and religious 
behavior. This finding fits the existing knowledge about the Orthodox jurisdictions in 
Ukraine (Krindatch 2003; Mitrokhin 2001; Yelensky 2010). The narratives employed 
by these churches are connected with national sentiments. Therefore, national identities 
might invoke people’s affiliation with a particular church regardless actual religious 
meaning behind such affiliation. It seems that nationalistic narratives of church 
competition do not necessary influence actual personal experience of religiosity among 
Ukrainians. 
4.8. Discussion and conclusions 
 The main goal of this paper was to show how church competition affected 
religiosity in post-Communist Ukraine by looking into the role of intra-doctrinal 
competition (IDC). A central argument of this paper is that IDC of the Orthodox 
jurisdictions positively affected religious affiliations, church attendance, subjective 
religiosity, and praying at home among Ukrainians. The effect of IDC on religious 
affiliations was particularly strong for individuals who preferred Ukrainian language, 
although this was not the case for religious behavior. 
Drawing on the literature on post-Communist transformations as well as 
Ukrainian religious revivals, this paper suggests that (i) religious groups became 
important actors of the political process in Ukraine; (ii) they exploited narratives about 
an idealized past as well as an utopian future of the nation to mobilize their 
congregation; (iii) this nationalistic competition contributed to the split within the 
Orthodox Church in Ukraine. This process was theorized to affect religious values and 
behavior of people in Ukraine. Therefore, the contribution of this paper to the literature 
on church competition and post-Communist religious revivals is twofold. First, it sheds 
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new light on previously understudied intra-doctrinal competition and points to the 
crucial dimension of national narratives. Second, in contrast to many previous empirical 
studies of post-Communist religious markets, this paper employs data on religious 
communities at the regional level in order to circumvent measurement errors. 
 Overall, these findings confirm some old ideas that religious markets are indeed 
strong predictors of religious participation once the relevant context is properly 
considered (Froese 2004; Froese and Pfaff 2001; Lechner 2007; McCleary and Barro 
2006). However, this paper offers some new ideas as well. Most of the existing studies 
agree that religious markets are very complex and that they have multiple dimensions, 
some of which have never been brought to light. Intra-doctrinal competition based on 
political cleavages is one if these dimensions. Future studies could apply this framework 
to other Orthodox societies, which witnessed strong intra-doctrinal cleavages, i.e. 
Bulgaria, Moldova, and Macedonia. However, this framework does not have to be 
limited to Orthodox Churches only. One may think about competition of different 
streams of Protestantism in Western societies, Sunni and Shia in Middle East, and 
Greek Catholics and Roman Catholics in Eastern Europe. By bringing context into the 
study of religious markets, this paper contributes to reframing religious competition 
theory. 
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 Appendix 
Five different sources were employed in order to compile the final dataset: 
• The reports of the Religious Informational Service of Ukraine (RISU); 
• Publications in the magazine “Liudyna i Svit” (L&S); 
• Publications in scientific volumes and textbooks (Yelensky, 2010); 
• The State Committee on Nationalities and Religions for years before 2010 (State 
archives); 
• The Department for Religions and Nationalities in the Ministry of Culture for 
years after 2010 (State archives). 
 Some of these resources provide information about religious communities on the 
level of regions (marked as “RegStat” in the final data file). Frequently, these sources 
overlap which provides an opportunity to compare the data. Almost always small 
discrepancies between the sources were observed. Such discrepancies can be attributed 
to several reasons: sometimes the documents covered different periods of time within 
the same years; not all Protestant churches were included in some of the sources; in rare 
cases typos were observed. Despite the observed discrepancies, virtually all sources 
indicated the same rates of growth for all communities.  
 All these sources are presented in Figure 3.4 with respect to the major church 
communities. The numbers are based on all communities, i.e. including those who 
received their state registration and those who were rejected by the state. In some years 
these numbers were provided separately, and in some years they were given as totals. 
Thus, a decision was made to collapse all the numbers in order to minimize possible 
misunderstandings. Finally, all different Protestant churches are collapsed here as well 
since in some years it was difficult to distinguish each church precisely.  
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 Note that the final estimates presented in the paper in Figure 3.1 should be 
treated as a measure of change but not as a precise numerical indicator of the amount of 
religious communities in a given year. These estimates are obtained as a simple average 
of all the available data. 
Figure 3.4. Religious communities at the country level for six major religious groups in Ukraine, 1991-
2013.  
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